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MILLER’S PROMISE: RE-EVALUATING EXTREME 
CRIMINAL SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 
Nick Straley* 
Abstract: Scientific, legal, and societal notions about youth have come together to 
reaffirm an age-old concept—children are different and they change as they grow older. In 
recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has required courts and legislatures to take 
a new look at extreme criminal sentences imposed upon children. Life without parole 
sentences and decades-long, determinate sentences are constitutionally suspect when applied 
to children because they fail to adequately account for the dynamism of youth. Miller v. 
Alabama and Graham v. Florida announced two important principles: (1) that an extreme 
sentence can only be imposed upon a child following an individualized hearing at which a 
court considers myriad mitigating factors; and (2) that in the vast majority of cases, the child 
should have a realistic opportunity for parole at some point in the future. During the recently 
completed 2014 session, the Washington legislature took steps to address some of the 
Supreme Court’s concerns, but work remains before Washington law fully incorporates the 
principles laid out in Miller and Graham. Legal principles announced in the Court’s recent 
cases require individualized sentencing hearings any time a child may be sentenced to 
decades behind bars. Moreover, in no case should a child be sentenced to spend the rest of 
his life in prison without some possibility of release in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent psychosocial studies and neurological research have proven 
that the structures and processes of the adolescent brain render young 
people more reckless and more susceptible to negative familial and 
societal pressures.1 In a series of recent cases, culminating in Miller v. 
1. See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE D. STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 
(2008) (discussing impact of neurological and psychosocial research on manner in which criminal 
law addresses criminal behavior by young people); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, 
(Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741 (2000) (presenting research showing that adolescents scored significantly 
worse than adults in tests of responsibility, perspective, and temperance); Sarah Durston et al., 
Anatomical MRI of the Developing Human Brain: What Have We Learned?, 40 J. AM. ACAD. 
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1012 (2001) (discussing various neuroimaging studies of 
juvenile brain development); Neir Eshel et al., Neural Substrates of Choice Selection in Adults and 
Adolescents: Development of the Ventrolateral Prefrontal and Anterior Cingulate Cortices, 45 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1270 (2007) (presenting neurological research showing that adolescents do 
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Alabama,2 the United States Supreme Court relied on this science and 
recognized that, for young people, a confluence of immature judgment, 
vulnerability, social pressure, and decreased ability to appreciate long-
term consequences can create a toxic environment with tragic results.3 
The chances for unthinking violence are exponentially increased when 
homelessness, familial abuse or neglect, mental illness, and chemical 
dependency are added to the mix.4 
However, because of their developing characters, children are also 
uniquely able to transform themselves; they can change from foolhardy, 
risk-seeking teenagers into mature, rehabilitated adults.5 It is these 
“characteristics of youth”6 and the developing science that explains them 
that animate the Supreme Court’s recent juvenile sentencing decisions.7 
As discussed in those cases, physiological differences between teenagers 
and adults carry constitutional significance and require that children be 
sentenced differently—a principle firmly rooted in recent science and 
longstanding legal distinctions between children and adults.8 
not utilize regulatory areas of brain during decision-making to same extent as adults); Laurence 
Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed in Behavior and 
Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764 (2008) 
(study demonstrating heightened vulnerability to risk taking among adolescents). The author relied 
heavily upon amici curiae briefs filed in the Miller case for assistance with research and 
understanding the scientific evidence. See Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n & the Am. Academy of 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Miller v. Alabama, 
__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Miller AMA Brief]; Brief 
for the Am. Psychological Ass’n et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller v. 
Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Miller APA 
Brief].  
2. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
3. Cf. id. at 2468–69 (discussing before the Court details of the boys and their crimes). 
4. Alan Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Making of Delinquent 
Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 33, 47 
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); see generally Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-
Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 
PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993) (examining antisocial behavior among adolescents and interaction of 
neuro-psychological development and criminogenic environments). 
5. The author uses the terms “youth,” “juvenile,” and “child” interchangeably throughout this 
Article to refer to people under the age of eighteen. As discussed below, in the vast majority of 
circumstances, the law and society treat all such people as “children.” Cf. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 
(“[C]hildren are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles 
have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, ‘they are less deserving 
of the most severe punishments’” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)). 
6. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
7. Id. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. 
8. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to 
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”); id. at 71 (“A sentence lacking 
any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense. With respect 
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In Part I, this Article analyzes Miller v. Alabama,9 Graham v. 
Florida,10 and Roper v. Simmons.11 Part II explains the science 
underpinning those decisions. Part III shows how that science helps 
explain why the men currently serving life without parole in Washington 
for crimes committed as juveniles came to reside in prison. Part IV 
argues that the principles announced in Graham and Miller apply with 
equal force to long determinate sentences imposed upon children. Part V 
discusses how Miller and Graham track a growing societal disfavor for 
extreme punishments for youth. Part VI examines how the Washington 
legislature responded to this changing legal and social landscape during 
the 2014 legislative session when it fundamentally altered the sentencing 
structure applicable to children who commit serious crimes. Finally, Part 
VII discusses what else courts and the legislature should do to fully 
realize Miller’s promise. 
I. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS RECOGNIZED THAT 
CHILDREN MUST BE SENTENCED DIFFERENTLY THAN 
ADULTS 
In a trilogy of recent cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
juveniles differ from adults in their psychosocial and neurological 
makeups and therefore must be sentenced differently—even when those 
children have committed heinous crimes.12 In 2005 in Roper v. 
Simmons,13 the Court extended the categorical rule it set out in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma14 barring the death penalty for children under 
the age of sixteen, to any person who was under the age of eighteen at 
the time of the crime.15 While Roper announced a number of important 
principles, the true impact of those newly articulated constitutional rules 
to life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, none of the goals of penal sanctions that 
have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
provides an adequate justification.” (citation omitted)). 
9. 132 S. Ct. at 2455. 
10. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
11. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
12. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (holding it is unconstitutional to impose mandatory life-
without-parole sentences on juvenile offenders); Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75 (holding it is 
unconstitutional to sentence youth to life without parole for non-homicide crimes); Roper, 543 U.S. 
at 559–60 (holding it is unconstitutional to sentence youth to death). 
13. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
14. 487 U.S. 815 (1987). 
15. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (2005). 
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awaited further development in Graham and Miller.16 
The Court heard arguments in Graham v. Florida, a case that 
presented the question whether children can be sentenced to life without 
parole for non-homicides, in the fall of 2009.17 In an opinion authored 
by Justice Kennedy, the Court ruled that imposition of such sentences in 
cases in which no one was killed violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.18 
The Graham Court expanded upon the discussion begun in Roper that 
the unique attributes of children require that they be sentenced 
differently than adults. As in Roper, the Graham Court accepted recent 
scientific breakthroughs that explain why young people are inclined to 
engage in risky, anti-social behaviors; how peer pressure and poor 
familial circumstances more dramatically affect them; and how—given 
expected neurological development—many of them will outgrow the 
irresponsible, unthinking acts which lead them to prison.19 The Graham 
Court noted, “‘juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified 
among the worst offenders.’ A juvenile is not absolved of responsibility 
for his actions, but his transgression ‘is not as morally reprehensible as 
that of an adult.’”20 Because children change as they age, a constitutional 
sentencing structure requires that a “juvenile offender [be given] a 
chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”21 Life without parole 
sentences violate this tenet by removing any chance that a child will one 
day again walk the world as a free person, no matter how well he may 
have done while behind bars.22 Graham therefore required that any child 
convicted of a non-homicide crime be provided a “realistic opportunity 
to obtain release” at some point in the future.23 
Miller v. Alabama presented the Court with the next question in the 
16. The Court in Roper extended the categorical rule it set out in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815 (1987), barring the death penalty for children under the age of sixteen, to all children. 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. 
17. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75. 
18. Id. at 75. 
19. Id. at 68–69. 
20. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835). 
21. Graham, 560 U.S. at 73 (“Even if the State’s judgment that Graham was incorrigible were 
later corroborated by prison misbehavior or failure to mature, the sentence was still disproportionate 
because that judgment was made at the outset.”); id. at 75 (“A State is not required to guarantee 
eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, 
however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”). 
22. Id. at 69–71. 
23. Id. at 75. 
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sequence: whether children who commit murder can be sentenced to 
mandatory life without parole.24 In a few paragraphs, the Miller Court 
referred to the lengthy discussions in Roper and Graham of the science 
and its relevance to the constitutional analysis the Court must 
undertake.25 As the Miller Court explained, these cognitive and 
physiological differences are constitutionally relevant in three ways: (1) 
juveniles are less able than adults to control and understand the 
consequences of their actions; (2) juveniles are more likely than adults to 
be affected by negative influences in their lives; and (3) juveniles are 
uniquely capable of rehabilitation and reform.26 These differences render 
children less culpable than adults and more likely to change for the 
better.27 
The Graham and Miller Courts also recognized that life without 
parole sentences are uniquely severe when applied to children.28 By 
virtue of their younger ages, children sentenced to life without parole 
will, on the whole, serve more years behind bars than adults condemned 
to the same fate.29 Moreover, they will be subject to greater levels of 
abuse and hardship while incarcerated because of their particular 
vulnerabilities. A recent report from the National Institute of Corrections 
indicates that in 2005 and 2006 between ten and twenty percent of the 
victims of inmate-on-inmate sexual violence in U.S. jails were under the 
age of eighteen, even though they represented only one percent of all jail 
inmates.30 
A life without parole sentence imposed upon a child constitutes an 
irrevocable decision, one taken without sufficient information about the 
person that child will become. As Justice Kennedy noted in Graham: 
[L]ife without parole sentences share some characteristics with 
death sentences that are shared by no other sentences. The State 
does not execute the offender sentenced to life without parole, 
but the sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is 
irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties 
without giving hope of restoration . . . . [T]his sentence “means 
24. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
25. Id. at 2464. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 2466; Graham, 560 U.S. at 70–71.  
29. Graham, 560 U.S. at 70. 
30. JASON ZIEDENBERG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., YOU’RE AN ADULT 
NOW: YOUTH IN ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 11 (2011), available at http://static.nicic.gov/ 
Library/025555.pdf. 
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denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character 
improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future 
might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he 
will remain in prison for the rest of his days.31 
Given their more limited culpability, their greater rehabilitative 
capacity, and the uniquely severe consequences of life sentences upon 
children, the Court found life without parole sentences for children to be 
tantamount to death sentences.32 As in Graham, the Miller Court 
recognized that because of their developing minds, and because of the 
harshness of life without parole sentences, children cannot be sentenced 
in the same manner as adults and should rarely face the same 
punishment.33 
These two factors—the severity of life without parole and the 
particular qualities of youth—prohibit the sentencing of a child to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole if the mitigating factors of youth 
and the child’s upbringing require a lesser sentence.34 The Court 
explicitly adopted the rationale from its extensive death penalty 
jurisprudence in its decisions regarding extreme sentences for children.35 
And like the death sentence, the Court commanded that a life without 
parole sentence be imposed rarely and only after an exacting analysis.36 
Unwilling at that time to categorically ban life without parole sentences 
for children who commit murder, the Miller Court prohibited the 
imposition of such a sentence absent an individualized sentencing 
hearing.37 At this hearing, a court must consider evidence that mitigates 
against condemning the child to die behind bars.38 
The Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller relied upon a wealth of 
relatively recent neurological and psychosocial research in finding that 
children must be sentenced differently than adults.39 An understanding 
31. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70 (third alteration in original) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 
944, 944 (Nev. 1989)); see also id. at 70–71 (“Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment 
for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a 
greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each 
sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only. This reality cannot be 
ignored.” (citation omitted)). 
32. Id. at 69–70; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64. 
33. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 2466–67. 
36. Id. at 2468–69. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 
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of the science is therefore crucial to grasping the fundamental shifts in 
juvenile sentencing the United States Supreme Court has been recently 
exploring. 
II. NEUROLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL RESEARCH 
PROVES THAT CHILDREN ARE LESS CULPABLE AND 
MORE LIKELY TO CHANGE THAN ADULTS 
Adolescents’ behavioral immaturity mirrors the anatomical 
immaturity of their brains. To a degree never before understood, 
scientists can now demonstrate that adolescents are immature, not only 
to the observer’s naked eye, but in the very fibers of their brains.40 
Psychosocial and neurological advances prove that juveniles act 
impulsively, react rashly, and engage in risky behaviors without 
appreciation for the potential consequences due to psychological and 
anatomical immaturity.41 The same impulses that compel youth to 
explore, experiment, and learn through experience also compel them to 
engage in risky, sensation-seeking behaviors.42 
The physiology of the teenage brain is fundamentally different than it 
will be later in adulthood. The dynamic nature of this development 
accounts for a great deal of the behavioral changes children exhibit as 
they age.43 Perfectly normal neurological development renders teenagers 
more likely to engage in socially destructive and risky behaviors.44 
The prefrontal cortex—the region of the brain that controls the 
“executive functions,” including emotional regulation, impulse control, 
working memory, risk assessment, and the ability to evaluate future 
consequences—is one of the last neurological structures to fully 
develop.45 Once mature, the prefrontal cortex modulates impulsive 
543 U.S. 551, 617–18 (2005). 
40. Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Roper AMA Brief]. 
41. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. 
42. Miller APA Brief, supra note 1, at 5; see also Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 741, 
747–49, 754 & tbl.4; Steinberg et al., supra note 1, at 1774–76. 
43. See Eshel et al., supra note 1, at 1270–71; Kathryn L. Modecki, Addressing Gaps in the 
Maturity of Judgment Literature: Age Differences and Delinquency, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 78, 
79–80 (2008); Steinberg et al., supra note 1, at 1765. 
44. Moffitt, supra note 4, at 685–86; see also Miller APA Brief, supra note 1, at 7 (reckless 
behavior “is ‘virtually a normative characteristic of adolescent development’” (quoting Jeffrey 
Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL 
REV. 339, 344 (1992))). 
45. See Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 17–19; Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence 
for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 
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behavioral urges emanating from other earlier developing regions of the 
brain, like the amygdala.46 However, the prefrontal cortex remains 
structurally immature until early adulthood, around the mid-twenties.47 
Until that time, adolescents’ decision-making and responses to stimuli 
are largely directed by the amygdala and other more primitive 
neurological regions.48 As the brain develops through adolescence and 
into early adulthood, the communication between regions of the brain 
improves, allowing complicated information to flow more freely and for 
areas of the brain associated with higher-level reasoning to begin to 
assert more control.49 While developing structurally, teenage brains also 
produce an imbalance of dopamine and serotonin, the neurotransmitters 
that regulate pleasure and the desire for rewards.50 The interplay 
between these various neurological structures and processes causes 
correspondingly stronger desires for immediate pleasure and 
859, 860 (1999). 
46. See Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 27; Ralph Adolphs, The Human Amygdala and 
Emotion, 5 NEUROSCIENTIST 125, 125–26 (1999). The amygdala evolved early on to detect danger 
and produce rapid protective reactions, the “fight or flight” reflex. Abigail A. Baird et al., 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 
38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 195 (1999). 
47. See Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During 
Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 8174, 8177 (2004). 
See generally Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 17–27 (discussing current scientific understanding 
regarding how the brain develops as children age into adulthood). Two separate processes are 
involved in the development of the prefrontal cortex. First, the brain undergoes what is colloquially 
known as “pruning.” Unused and redundant synaptic pathways begin to close down. Though fewer 
in number, the remaining neural networks become stronger and more efficient. Durston et al., supra 
note 1. Second, the brain begins to produce a greater abundance of myelin, a neural network 
insulator that allows electrical messages to move more effectively throughout the brain. See 
ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED MIND 144 
(2001). 
48. See Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 29–32; Eshel et al., supra note 1, at 1271. 
49. Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 27 (discussing evidence that “development of top-down 
effective connectivity from cognitive control regions is critical in supporting active inhibitory 
control” (quoting Kai Hwang et al., Strengthening of Top-Down Frontal Cognitive Control 
Networks Underlying the Development of Inhibitory Control: A Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Effective Connectivity Study, 30 J. NEUROSCIENCE 15535, 15543 (2010))). 
50. B. Luna, The Maturation of Cognitive Control and the Adolescent Brain, in FROM 
ATTENTION TO GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR: NEURODYNAMICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND 
CLINICAL TRENDS 249, 258 (Francisco Aboitiz & Diego Cosmelli eds., 2009); R. Andrew 
Chambers et al., Developmental Neurocircuitry of Motivation in Adolescence: A Critical Period of 
Addiction Vulnerability, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041, 1046 (2003); Laurence Steinberg, 
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 466 (2009). 
Researchers theorize that this neurochemical imbalance plays an important role in reinforcing 
learning in adolescents. Dustin Wahlstrom et al., Neurobehavioral Evidence for Changes in 
Dopamine System Activity During Adolescence, 34 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 631, 
643 (2010). 
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gratification in adolescents, while also rendering them less able to resist 
those heightened urges.51 
This observable neurological immaturity plays out in psychological 
studies and controlled observations of teenage behavior. Teenagers score 
significantly lower than adults on assessments measuring “impulse 
control” and “suppression of aggression.”52 Even youth who have 
developed cognitive abilities similar to adults do not have the same 
ability to self-regulate their behaviors, modulate their emotions, or 
weigh the consequences of their actions.53 
The combination of a developing brain and the psychosocial tendency 
toward risk, impulsivity, and limited judgment often results in criminal 
conduct. Studies have shown that it is statistically typical to engage in 
some form of criminal behavior during adolescence.54 These behavioral 
patterns are particularly acute for teenagers in groups. Adolescents 
commit crimes in groups at a much greater rate than adults.55 The 
presence of peers increases the likelihood and seriousness of risky 
behaviors beyond what a teenager acting alone would undertake.56 By 
contrast, adult behavior is not significantly impacted by the presence of 
peers.57 
As the Miller Court recognized, these scientific truths have a direct 
51. Miller AMA Brief, supra note 1, at 29–30 (the differing timing of development in various 
areas of the juvenile brain means that “adolescents experience increasing motivation for risky and 
reward-seeking behavior without a corresponding increase in the ability to self-regulate behavior”). 
52. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 749, 754 tbl.4; see also Miller APA Brief, supra note 
1, at 9–10. 
53. Miller APA Brief, supra note 1, at 6; Steinberg, supra note 50, at 467. The areas of the brain 
that regulate cognition and logic develop relatively early in adolescence; gains in cognitive 
capability plateau at about age sixteen. See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand 
Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 333, 333–34 (2003); Daniel Keating, Cognitive and Brain Development, in HANDBOOK OF 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 45, 64 (Richard Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2004). 
However, social and emotional maturity continues to develop well into early adulthood. See 
Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 1, at 756. In other words, teenagers have the neurological 
foundation to support logical, rational thinking, but lack self-restraint and the ability to fully 
comprehend consequences, especially in emotionally charged settings. Id. at 743–45; see also 
Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: Decision-
Making Competence in Adolescents and Adults, 22 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 257, 
264–71 (2001). 
54. Moffit, supra note 4, at 685–86; see also L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related 
Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 421 (2000). 
55. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 39. 
56. Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and 
Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 632 (2005). 
57. Jason Chein et al., 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F1, F2 (2011). 
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impact on the applicability of criminal sanctions to children: 
“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to 
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult 
minds”—for example, in “parts of the brain involved in behavior 
control.” . . . [T]hose findings—of transient rashness, proclivity 
for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both lessened a 
child’s “moral culpability” and enhanced the prospect that, as 
the years go by and neurological development occurs, his 
“deficiencies will be reformed.”58 
Juveniles are uniquely susceptible to negative influences in their lives 
because of their psychosocial and neurological immaturity. Troubled 
family lives, limited educational achievement, and poor neighborhood 
conditions are highly correlated with youth who commit homicides,59 as 
is early experimentation with drugs and alcohol.60 Neurologically based 
impulses towards risk and reward-seeking behaviors—and the 
accompanying lack of forethought—combine with abuse, chemical 
dependency, mental illness, and other negative environmental factors to 
cause some youth to act violently.61 
Because of their emotional immaturity and tendencies towards risk, 
teenagers have been granted very little legal autonomy over their own 
lives.62 These realities render youth “‘more vulnerable . . . to negative 
58. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–65 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)); see also Graham, 560 
U.S. at 68–74 (developments in brain science and psychology reveal fundamental differences 
between adult and juvenile minds that require that children be subject to different sentences than 
adults). While the Miller and Graham rulings involve life without parole sentences imposed upon 
children, the Court’s rationale would seem to apply to any criminal sentence that is imposed equally 
upon children and adults. If a child who commits murder is less culpable than an adult convicted of 
the same crime, then similarly, a child who steals should be treated less harshly than an adult. The 
Miller Court’s rationale requires a significant reevaluation of not only the most serious criminal 
sentences, but of sentencing of any child in the adult system. See infra Parts V and VI.  
59. See ROLF LOEBER & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, YOUNG HOMICIDE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 
RISK FACTORS, PREDICTION, AND PREVENTION FROM CHILDHOOD 61 (2011). 
60. Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003). 
61. Kazdin, supra note 4, at 47. See generally Thomas Grisso, Adolescent Offenders with Mental 
Disorders, 18 FUTURE CHILD. 143, 143 (2008) (showing linkage between mental disorders in 
juveniles and increased risk of impulsive and aggressive behaviors that lead to criminal justice 
system involvement). 
62. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (“It has been noted that ‘adolescents are overrepresented statistically 
in virtually every category of reckless behavior.’ In recognition of the comparative immaturity and 
irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, 
serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent. The second area of difference is that 
juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including 
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influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers; 
they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the 
ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.”63 
The Miller Court recognized that the natural attendant characteristics 
that all juveniles share, and the particular family and social 
circumstances of individual youth, can lead to awful violence.64 It 
illustrated this point by discussing the particulars of the crimes and 
circumstances before it.65 The Miller Court noted that the two 
petitioners, Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson, were both fourteen years 
old at the times of their crimes.66 Jackson and two other boys attempted 
to rob a video store.67 One of the other boys shot and killed the clerk.68 
Jackson was sentenced to life without parole for his role in the crime.69 
In reviewing the facts of his crime, the Court found that Jackson’s young 
age “could well have affected his calculation of the risk” of following 
his armed friend to a video store “as well as his willingness to walk 
away at that point.”70 Moreover, the Court highlighted Jackson’s 
difficult family life and “immersion in violence” as relevant 
psychosocial factors that contributed to his actions.71 
Turning to Evan Miller, the Court pointed out that the fourteen-year-
old’s stepfather abused him, his drug-addicted mother neglected him, 
and that he grew up in foster care.72 The abuse and dysfunction led him 
peer pressure. ‘[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a 
person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.’ This is explained in part 
by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over 
their own environment.” (quoting Arnett, supra note 44, at 339; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 115 (1982))). 
63. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458 (alteration in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). The law 
also imposes particular restrictions upon the freedoms of children that often place them at the mercy 
of abusive family members without the power or autonomy to adequately protect themselves. 
Government agencies tasked with protecting children are often unable to provide appropriate and 
timely assistance because of limited resources and large caseloads. The lack of available state 
support is particularly acute for teenagers involved with abusive families. For many teenagers, 
homelessness is the only realistic alternative to remaining in households dominated by physical or 
sexual abuse. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, HOMELESS YOUTH 1 (2008). 
64. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458. 
65. Id. at 2461–62. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 2461. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 2468. 
71. Id. at 2468–69. 
72. Id. at 2469. 
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to attempt suicide on at least four occasions, his earliest attempt in 
kindergarten.73 And while his crime was terrible, his reduced culpability 
and limited prior criminal record required a court to reevaluate his life 
without parole sentence to ensure imposition of an “appropriate 
penalty.”74 These negative influences and mitigating factors are qualities 
of youth that courts must take into account when deciding whether to 
impose long criminal sentences upon children.75 
The psychosocial and neurological evidence also proves another 
important truth: children change. As explained by the Miller Court, 
because “a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his 
traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be evidence of 
irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”76 
The incidence of violent criminal behavior generally peaks during 
adolescence and falls off in young adulthood.77 In fact, the vast majority 
of youth outgrow criminal behaviors, and it is impossible to determine 
during childhood which child is truly incorrigible.78 Put simply, no 
accurate means exist to predict whether any particular youth will 
continue to commit violent acts as an adult.79 “Assessing 
adolescents . . . presents the formidable challenge of trying to capture a 
rapidly changing process with few trustworthy markers.”80 This 
scientific fact requires that the prospects for rehabilitation be considered 
before children are sentenced to life terms81 and explains why children, 
irrespective of conviction, should be provided some real opportunity for 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 2469. 
76. Id. at 2464 (alterations in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2010)). 
77. Arnett, supra note 44, at 343; Moffitt, supra note 4, at 675 fig.1; Terrie Moffitt, Natural 
Histories of Delinquency, in CROSS-NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH ON HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 3, 29 (Elmar Weitekamp & Hans-Jurgen Kerner eds., 
1994). 
78. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 1014–15; see also Kathryn C. Monahan et al., 
Trajectories of Antisocial Behavior and Psychosocial Maturity from Adolescence to Young 
Adulthood, 45 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1654, 1654–55 (2009); Moffitt, supra note 4, at 685–86. 
79. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 55–56 (Iowa 2013) (quoting SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 
1, at 54) (“[I]t is very difficult to identify which juveniles are ‘adolescence-limited offenders,’ 
whose antisocial behavior begins and ends during adolescence and early adulthood, and those who 
are ‘life-course-persistent offenders’ whose antisocial behavior continues into adulthood.”); Edward 
P. Mulvey et al., Trajectories of Desistance and Continuity in Antisocial Behavior Following Court 
Adjudication Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 22 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 453, 468–70 
(2010). 
80. Edward P. Mulvey & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Inherent Limits of Predicting School Violence, 
56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 797, 799 (2001). 
81. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468–69. 
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release from prison at some point during their lifetimes.82 
Given this science, traditional rationales supporting criminal 
sanctions—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
apply with less force to children than to adults.83 Retribution is less 
compelling with children because their more limited ability to control 
criminal behavior and understand emotional impulses renders them less 
culpable than adults.84 Similarly, children are less likely to be deterred 
by criminal sanctions because “their immaturity, recklessness, and 
impetuosity—make them less likely to consider potential punishment.”85 
Furthermore, incapacitation does not justify life without parole sentences 
for youth because “[d]eciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever will be a 
danger to society’ would require ‘mak[ing] a judgment that [he] is 
incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’”86 And 
finally, barring a child from ever living outside a prison’s walls 
“forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” It reflects “an irrevocable 
judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society, at odds with a 
child’s capacity for change.”87 Rationale that may support life sentences 
for adults do not similarly support long sentences for children. 
III. THE MEN SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
DEMONSTRATE HOW THE SCIENCE PLAYS OUT IN THE 
REAL WORLD 
As demonstrated by the circumstances of their crimes, many of the 
men serving life without parole for crimes committed as children 
exhibited the hallmark features of youth: immaturity, impetuosity, and 
failure to appreciate the risks and the consequences of their actions.88 
More than half of the men serving this sentence in Washington State 
82. Cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–71 (2010). 
83. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 73). 
87. Id. at 2465 (quoting Graham, 569 U.S. at 74). This discussion of the traditional rationale 
behind criminal sentences in Miller follows on from the Court’s analysis in earlier cases. See, e.g., 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–74 (discussing how penological justifications regarding sentencing are 
significantly different when applied to children). 
88. There are currently thirty men serving life without parole sentences for crimes committed as 
children. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CORR., OFFENDERS IN CUSTODY THAT WERE SENTENCED TO 
LWOP PRIOR TO TURNING 18 YEARS OF AGE [hereinafter DOC JLWOP INFORMATION]. One other 
man, Ansel Hofstetter, was sentenced to life without parole as a child in 1992. Recently the Pierce 
County Superior Court resentenced him to a determinate forty-year term. See discussion infra notes 
123–125 and accompanying text. 
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were sixteen years old or younger at the time of their offenses.89 Barry 
Massey was thirteen years old at the time of his crime and was one of 
the youngest people ever sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole in the United States.90 Three others were only fourteen years 
old.91 
Experts who evaluated the then thirteen-year-old Barry Massey 
described him as “passive and naïve;” a child who lacked the capacity to 
appreciate the consequences of his actions.92 He and a fifteen-year-old 
boy killed a store owner during the commission of a robbery.93 Barry’s 
co-defendant became involved in the robbery that ended in murder to 
steal fishing equipment, food, and money so that he could “live off the 
land” and support himself, after learning that his father was leaving for 
Germany to get married.94 After his arrest, Barry indicated that one of 
his life goals was to overcome his fear of the dark.95 
As in the Massey case, peer pressure played a role in a number of the 
other murders that led to life without parole sentences for children. In 
several instances, the boys committed their crimes with teenage or older 
peers.96 Six of the youth had adult co-defendants, two of whom received 
significantly lower sentences than the child. In a number of instances, 
the fellow youthful co-defendant received a much shorter determinate 
89. See WASH. COAL. FOR THE JUST TREATMENT OF YOUTH, A REEXAMINATION OF YOUTH 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON: IMPLICATIONS OF NEW 
FINDINGS ABOUT JUVENILE RECIDIVISM AND ADULT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 12–13 (2009) 
[hereinafter COALITION REPORT], available at http://www.columbialegal.org/files/JLWOP_cls.pdf. 
The Washington Coalition for the Just Treatment of Youth, a coalition of organizations that work 
with children, reviewed the case files and other available information related to most of the men 
currently serving life without parole for crimes committed as children in Washington. Much of the 
data discussed herein can be found in the Coalition’s report and findings. The report identified 
twenty-eight adolescents serving life without parole for crimes committed as children. Following 
the report’s publication, new information provided by Department of Corrections (DOC) indicated 
that there were an additional two men serving juvenile life without parole in addition to those 
discussed in the Coalition Report. 
90. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD 
CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 20 (2008). 
91. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 13. 
92. See Psychological Evaluation of Barry Massey by Norma D. Tropp, Ph.D. 4 (Mar. 27, 1987). 
Some of the information to which the authors refer herein is unverified and based upon reports from 
the men themselves. 
93. Judgment & Sentence, State v. Massey, No. 87-1-01354-7 (Pierce Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 5, 1998). 
94. Source document held on file with Columbia Legal Services. 
95. Id. 
96. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 16–17 (a number of the children offended with other 
juveniles or with adults). 
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prison sentence.97 In some cases, a younger child may have been 
influenced by older co-defendants.98 Other cases raise questions about 
the youth’s degree of planning and participation in the crime.99 
Because of their immaturity, youth are also “at a significant 
disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”100 As Justice Kennedy noted, 
“[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding 
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel seen as part of the 
adult world a rebellious youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions by 
one charged with a juvenile offense.”101 Most children lack the 
autonomy and understanding to protect themselves or seek assistance 
upon their involvement with the criminal system.102 
Many of the twenty-nine men serving juvenile life without parole in 
Washington had little-to-no experience with the criminal justice system 
at the time of their arrests. Roughly one-third of them had no prior 
criminal history before being sentenced to life without parole.103 
Available records indicate that not one defendant had ever been 
transferred out of juvenile court until being charged with the offense for 
which he is currently serving life without parole.104 Moreover, less than 
97. Id. at 17. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 16 (“[A] number of these youth were charged along with co-defendants and therefore 
had varying levels of participation in the crime.”). This is not to suggest that these men do not 
deserve punishment for their participation in these terrible crimes. The seriousness of their crimes 
must be taken into account when determining an appropriate sentence and when evaluating whether 
they should be eligible for release. In fact, it may be appropriate to continue to incarcerate some or 
all of these men for more time. As discussed in more detail later, individual sentencing hearings and 
parole eligibility provide appropriate means to balance the myriad factors and reach a just result. 
100. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010)). 
101. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78. 
102. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles “ignores that [the 
youth] might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies 
associated with youth”); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 78 (“[T]he features that distinguish juveniles 
from adults also put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles mistrust 
adults and have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the 
institutional actors within it. They are less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers 
to aid in their defense. Difficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding 
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel seen as part of the adult world a rebellious 
youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions by one charged with a juvenile offense. These factors 
are likely to impair the quality of a juvenile defendant’s representation.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
103. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 16 (“A third of the . . . adolescents were first time 
offenders with no prior juvenile or adult record.”). 
104. See Judgment & Sentence, State v. Alexander, No. 02-1-00527-9 (Whatcom Cnty. Wash. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2004); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Thang, No. 98-1-00278-7 (Pierce Cnty. 
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half committed prior offenses serious enough to be calculated in their 
offender scores at the time of their sentencings.105 As a result, many 
were unprepared to understand the adult criminal justice system or 
operate in a sophisticated manner within it. A number of the boys were 
questioned by police, and in none of the cases did the boys have either 
an attorney or even a parent present during the interrogations.106 
Donald Lambert’s case highlights the vulnerabilities of youth within 
the adult criminal justice system. Accused of two counts of aggravated 
first degree murder, he agreed to the juvenile court’s decline of 
Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2003); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Phet, No. 98-1-03162-1 (Pierce 
Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. June 28, 2002); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Lembcke, No. 01-1-00001-7 
(Stevens Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2001); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Leo, No. 98-1-
03161-3 (Pierce Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Anderson, 
No. 97-1-00421-3 (King Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2000); Judgment & Sentence, State v. 
Baranyi, No. 97-1-00343-8 (King Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 1999); Judgment & Sentence, 
State v. Backstrom, No. 97-1-01993-6 (Snohomish Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1999); Judgment 
& Sentence, State v. Munguia, No. 97-1-00679-5 (Benton Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. July 10, 1998); 
Judgment & Sentence, State v. Lambert, No. 97-1-00415-5 (Grant Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 
1997); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Loukaitis, No. 96-1-00548-0 (Grant Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. 
Oct. 10, 1997); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Weaver, No. 96-1-00123-9 (Whatcom Cnty. Wash. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1997); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Skay, No. 95-1-01942-5 (Snohomish 
Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1996); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Comeslast, No. 95-1-02260-
1 (Spokane Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. June 28, 1996); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Bassett, No. 95-
1-00415-9 (Grays Harbor Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 1996); Judgment & Sentence, State v. 
Boot, No. 95-1-00310-0 (Spokane Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 1996); Judgment & Sentence, 
State v. Ngoeung, No. 94-1-03719-8 (Pierce Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. June 27, 1995); Judgment & 
Sentence, State v. Haag, No. 94-1-00411-2 (Cowlitz Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 1995); 
Judgment & Sentence, State v. Delbosque, No. 93-100256-4 (Mason Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 
10, 1994); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Gaitan, No. 93-1-01018-0 (Yakima Cnty. Wash. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 21, 1993); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Gilbert, No. 92-1-00108-1 (Klickitat Cnty. 
Wash. Super. Ct. June 7, 1993); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Bourgeois, No. 92-1-06444-4 (King 
Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 1993); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Hofstetter, No. 91-1-02993-0 
(Pierce Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 1992); Judgment & Sentence, State v. Rice, Jr., No. 88-1-
00427-2 (Yakima Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1990); Judgment & Sentence, State v. McNeil, No. 
88-1-00428-1 (Yakima Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 1989); Amended Judgment & Sentence, 
State v. Furman, No. 89-1-00295-5 (Kitsap Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 1989); Judgment & 
Sentence, State v. Massey, No. 87-1-01354-7 (Pierce Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1988); 
Judgment & Sentence, State v. Stevenson, No. 87-1-00011-5 (Skamania Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. 
June 12, 1987). 
105. See supra note 104 (judgments and sentences demonstrating that less than half of defendants 
committed prior offenses that were calculated into their offender scores). An offender score is the 
calculation of the defendant’s criminal history used as part of the sentencing range calculation. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.525 (2012). The offender score and the seriousness of the crime 
determine the sentencing range. See id. § 9.94A.530(1) (“The intersection of the column defined by 
the offender score and the row defined by the offense seriousness score determines the standard 
sentence range . . . .”); id. § 9.94A.510 (standard range sentencing grid). The higher the offender 
score, the longer the criminal sentence imposed upon a particular defendant. Id. 
106. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 14 (“[I]n every case where the youth was questioned, 
not one had a parent or attorney present during interrogation by the police.”). 
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jurisdiction without a hearing.107 In preparing for trial, Lambert’s 
attorney did not hire an investigator or investigate Mr. Lambert’s 
background or the backgrounds of his co-defendants who were 
scheduled to testify against him.108 Shortly after the start of his trial, 
Lambert engaged in a hasty discussion with his attorney. After this 
discussion he pled guilty to aggravated first degree murder, and accepted 
a sentence of life without parole even though he was not eligible for a 
more severe sentence; a plea which offered him “no benefit.”109 He was 
sentenced to life without parole that afternoon.110 Had his attorney done 
any investigation, he would have discovered that Mr. Lambert had 
suffered lifelong problems as a result of his mother’s alcohol abuse 
during pregnancy.111 
Collectively, the family and home environments of Washington’s 
juvenile lifers were abysmal, marked by abuse and neglect, chemical 
dependency, homelessness, and other negative forces. Seventy-one 
percent of them had significant substance abuse problems as teenagers; 
forty-three percent suffered from mental illness; sixty percent reported 
experiencing abuse or severe neglect; and sixty-eight percent had been 
homeless at some point during their childhoods.112 Additionally, many of 
these children had parents who suffered from mental illness or substance 
abuse, were murdered, or were incarcerated themselves.113 The majority 
107. Lambert v. Blodgett, 248 F. Supp. 2d 988, 993 (E.D. Wash. 2003), rev’d in part, 393 F.3d 
943 (9th Cir. 2004). 
108. Id. at 1000. 
109. Id. at 1002. Mr. Lambert’s attorney was subsequently disbarred after the Washington State 
Supreme Court determined that he had “engaged in many different kinds of misconduct, involving 
many different clients, over a prolonged period of time.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against 
Romero, 152 Wash. 2d 124, 136, 94 P.3d 939, 945 (2004). Mr. Lambert’s youth probably played a 
role in his inability to challenge his attorney or recognize the poor representation he provided. 
110. Lambert, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 993. Procedural barriers have barred Mr. Lambert from 
receiving any post-conviction relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. See Lambert, 393 
F.3d at 943. 
111. Lambert, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 1000. 
112. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 14–15. A national study of people serving life without 
parole for crimes committed as children mirror these results from Washington. See ASHLEY NELLIS 
& THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL 
SURVEY 2–12 (2012) (forty-seven percent of 1579 people serving juvenile life without parole who 
responded to survey reported being victims of physical abuse, seventy-nine percent reported 
witnessing violence in their homes before entering prison, eighty-five percent had been suspended 
or expelled from school, and almost sixty percent had at least one incarcerated parent). 
113. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 15 (though available information is limited, records 
showed that fourteen percent of the youth had at least one parent with mental illness, thirty-six 
percent had a parent with chemical dependency, eighteen percent experienced foster care, seven 
percent had at least one parent murdered, and twenty-one percent had at least one parent in prison). 
Each of these risk factors increases the likelihood of juvenile criminal behavior. For example, 
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of the boys also battled serious educational deficits, developmental 
delays, or learning disabilities.114 At the times of their crimes, only a few 
of them were on track to graduate from high school and many had 
completely dropped out of school—one as early as the fourth grade.115 
While their young ages and troubled childhoods do not excuse their 
crimes, the experiences of three of the men—Michael Furman, Barry 
Loukaitis, and Michael Skay—illustrate the trauma and circumstances 
many of the men serving life without parole sentences faced as children. 
Michael Furman was born into a life of physical and sexual abuse, 
addiction, and violence. Michael was sexually abused as a child and was 
getting high with his uncle at thirteen.116 After discovering that his father 
was sexually abusing his sister, Michael dropped out of school at fifteen 
to protect her. He and his siblings were thereafter placed in foster 
care.117 At the time of his offense, he was high on methamphetamine and 
other drugs. His addled state of mind, when combined with his already 
diminished capacity and limited forethought, probably influenced the 
decisions he made before and during his crime.118 
Barry Loukaitis suffers from bipolar disorder and severe depression, 
and he was likely delusional when he entered a junior-high classroom 
with a gun, killed a teacher and two other students and injured 
another.119 While grappling with their son’s mental illness, Barry’s 
children with parents in prison are five to six times more at-risk to become involved in the criminal 
justice system. Keva M. Miller, The Impact of Parental Incarceration on Children: An Emerging 
Need for Effective Interventions, 23 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK. J. 472, 478 (2006). 
114. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 14 (“A quarter of the youth functioned in the low 
average range to borderline mentally retarded range at the time of the crime. Records also indicate 
that another eighteen percent showed indications of developmental delays, including provision of 
special education services.”). Developmental delays exacerbate the difficulties these youth had in 
navigating the criminal justice system. Id. (discussing one case in which psychologist testified that 
confession of youth was likely false as a result of developmental delays and police interrogation). 
115. Id. at 15 (“One dropped out of school in the fourth grade; eleven others only made it through 
grades in middle school. Several of the youth bounced around from school to school—one was in as 
many as fourteen schools by the eighth grade. Another dropped out in the eighth grade so that he 
could stay home to protect his sister from being molested by his father. Despite the young age at 
which these youth left the school system, their departures appear to have gone unnoticed.”). 
116. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., CRIMINAL HISTORY SUMMARY REGARDING MICHAEL FURMAN 
(2005). 
117. Id. 
118. Cf. State v. Furman, 122 Wash. 2d 440, 445, 858 P.2d 1092, 1096 (1993) (relating an expert 
witness’ testimony that Furman’s use of methamphetamine made him unable to reflect or deliberate 
about the mechanics or consequences of his actions). 
119. Judgment & Sentence, State v. Loukaitis, No. 96-1-00548-0 (Grant Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. 
Oct. 10, 1997). The sentencing court recognized that Mr. Loukaitis suffered from mental illness at 
the time of his crime. The court recommended that Mr. Loukaitis receive treatment while in prison 
for his serious mental health disorders. Id. 
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parents divorced and his mother became suicidal. Diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder herself, Barry’s mother often threatened to kill herself in 
front of Barry, including telling him her plan to kidnap his father and his 
new girlfriend and force them to watch her commit suicide. These 
threats continued up to the period directly before his crimes.120 
Michael Skay’s mother was a prostitute and chronic drug abuser who 
often left him alone for days on end from the time he was an infant. 
Michael did not meet his father until he was ten years old, upon his 
father’s release from prison. One of his mother’s live-in boyfriends 
physically and psychologically abused Michael, his siblings, and his 
mother. After the family moved out-of-state to escape the boyfriend’s 
violence, the man stalked them, repeatedly threatening Michael’s 
mother’s life. The man eventually murdered her only one year before 
Michael and an older co-defendant murdered an acquaintance and threw 
his body in a Snohomish County river.121 
Furman, Loukaitis, and Skay experienced horrific childhoods before 
they turned on their victims. Similar stories of abuse, chemical 
dependency, and mental illness can be found in the records of other 
juvenile offenders.122 
Many of the men currently serving life without parole illustrate the 
degree to which rehabilitation is possible as children age and become 
adults. Barry Massey and others have taught and counseled newly 
arrived inmates on how to take steps to change their lives in order to 
prosper upon release.123 Herbert Rice was sentenced to life without 
120. Peggy Andersen, Loukaitis’ Mother Says She Told Son of Plan to Kill Herself, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1997, at B1. 
121. Memorandum of Defendant Re: Sentencing, State v. Skay, No. 95-1-01942-5 (Snohomish 
Cnty. Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1996). 
122. A few of the men were sentenced before the Washington State Supreme Court outlawed 
application of the death penalty to children in 1993. See Furman, 122 Wash. 2d at 440, 858 P.2d at 
1092. In a few other cases, courts held pre-trial declination hearings in order to decide whether to 
transfer the child from juvenile to adult court. See, e.g., State v. Massey, 60 Wash. App. 131, 135, 
803 P.2d 340, 343 (1990). Court records contain some information regarding these men because of 
the development of some mitigation evidence as part of death penalty or declination proceedings. 
However, even though some information may have been considered by courts at the time of the 
original sentencings, these cases arose before the development of the new neurological science that 
supports Miller’s holding and the analysis it requires. Moreover, the Miller Court explicitly found 
that the evaluation of mitigating evidence during a declination process to adult court is not sufficient 
to support a life without parole sentence for a child. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 
2474–75 (2012). Mitigating information regarding many of the men has yet to be investigated or 
developed because the mandatory nature of the life without parole sentence imposed upon them 
rendered such factual development irrelevant to their sentencing decisions. 
123. Paige Dickerson, Lifers Lead Classes to Prepare Other Prisoners for Success Beyond Cell 
Walls, PENINSULA DAILY NEWS (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.peninsuladailynews.com/article/ 
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parole for the double murder of an elderly couple in their home that he 
and another boy committed in 1988.124 While serving his sentence, Mr. 
Rice has supported other Native American prisoners and their families 
from behind bars and organized cultural events that honor and celebrate 
Native American culture and community.125 
While these men committed terrible crimes as children, they have 
demonstrated the development and redemption that can occur while 
behind bars as teenagers age into grown men. Their lives illustrate real 
world examples of why the Roper, Graham, and Miller Courts 
compelled states to treat youth differently than adults when considering 
extreme criminal sentences. A court or parole board should consider 
how detrimental environmental factors, typical immaturity of youth, and 
characteristics particular to the individual child combined to lead these 
now men to prison and whether they have used the time there wisely. 
The example of Ansel Hofstetter proves that resentencings may result 
in significantly different sentences than those originally imposed. Ansel 
Hofstetter was originally sentenced to life without parole for a murder he 
committed as a sixteen-year-old.126 He was recently resentenced after he 
directly petitioned the original sentencing court for a new sentence 
following Miller.127 The Pierce County Superior Court vacated his 1992 
life without parole sentence and imposed a determinate forty-year 
sentence in its place.128 While he is still subject to an extremely long 
sentence, Ansel Hofstetter’s case demonstrates how resentencings may 
result in many of these men receiving different sentences from the ones 
originally imposed. However, his new forty-year mandatory determinate 
sentence also illustrates another related issue: whether and to what extent 
the principles announced in Roper, Graham, and Miller apply anytime a 
20100907/news/309079993/lifers-lead-classes-to-prepare-other-prisoners-for-success-beyond; Nina 
Shapiro, Gov. Gregoire: One Tough Clemency Judge, SEATTLE WEEKLY (July 3, 2007), 
http://www.seattleweekly.com/2007-07-04/news/gov-gregoire-one-tough-clemency-judge. 
124. See State v. Rice, 120 Wash. 2d 549, 554, 844 P.2d 416, 418 (1993). 
125. Sara Jean Green, Children Bring Joy to Prison Powwows, SEATTLE TIMES, May 28, 2012, at 
A1. 
126. State v. Hofstetter, 75 Wash. App. 390, 391 n.1, 878 P.2d 474, 475 n.1 (1994). 
127. Ansel Hofstetter’s case is unique in that he sought relief directly from the trial court. Most of 
the other thirty men filed personal restraint petitions directly with the Washington State Supreme 
Court, which has not yet ruled on any of those petitions. See, e.g., In re McNeil, No. 87654-1 
(Wash. Sup. Ct. filed July 23, 2012). The trial court resentenced him after Miller without waiting for 
direction from the Washington State Supreme Court. 
128. Rob Carson, Orting Clerk Killer’s Life Sentence Reduced to 40 Years, THE NEWS TRIBUNE 
(Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.thenewstribune.com/2013/10/18/2844694/orting-clerk-killers-life-
sentence.html. 
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court imposes a long determinate sentence upon a child.129 
IV. THE PRINCIPLES FROM THE MILLER/GRAHAM LINE OF 
CASES APPLY TO OTHER LONG SENTENCES IMPOSED 
UPON CHILDREN 
There are many people in Washington’s prisons serving long 
determinate sentences that functionally amount to life without parole. 
Though in theory a term of years will end, in many cases, because of the 
extreme length of the imposed term, the condemned will not survive to 
see his release date. In function, these long, determinate “life equivalent” 
or “de facto life” sentences are life in prison without the possibility of 
parole; both extreme sentences ensure that the defendant will die in 
prison. Furthermore, even if a child can actuarially expect to survive a 
long prison sentence, decades-long mandatory determinate sentences 
may be grossly disproportionate when applied to that particular child. 
Accordingly, principles from Graham and Miller should equally apply to 
long determinate sentences.130 
Graham and Miller announced two new rules related to the criminal 
sentencing of children. Miller commanded that before sentencing any 
child to life without parole, a court must provide the child with an 
individualized sentencing hearing.131 Graham required that any child 
convicted of a non-homicide receive a “realistic opportunity to obtain 
release” at some point in the future.132 The Supreme Court’s message in 
Graham and Miller is clear: individualized sentencing and parole 
eligibility should be essential features of sentencing structures involving 
children where long sentences are contemplated. 
In most cases, Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) 
129. Mr. Hofstetter was sentenced to a forty-year term under Washington’s Sentencing Reform 
Act (SRA), WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010 et seq. (2012), which requires that a judge impose a 
sentence within a sentencing range determined by the nature of the conviction, the existence of 
other sentence enhancements, and the defendant’s criminal record. See id. § 9.94A.530 (standard 
sentence range); id. § 9.94A.533 (adjustments to standard sentences). Because of the mechanistic 
manner in which criminal sentences are imposed under the SRA, Hofstetter’s recent SRA 
sentencing did not include the type of thorough individualized examination of all mitigating factors 
that Miller and now Washington law require. 
130. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121 (Iowa 2013) (“Graham requires a ‘meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ during the 
offender’s expected lifetime, and Miller requires an individualized consideration of youth as a 
mitigating factor at a sentencing hearing if such a realistic, meaningful opportunity will not be 
available.” (citations omitted)).  
131. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469–75 (2012). 
132. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
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determines the range of a permissible criminal sentence, based upon the 
nature and seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s offender 
score.133 Sentences for certain crimes must be served consecutively and 
mandatory sentence “enhancements” can add many additional years.134 
In limited, exceptional circumstances, a court may impose a sentence 
below the standard range.135 However, “age is not alone a substantial 
and compelling reason to impose an exceptional sentence.”136 And 
courts may not rely on many of the Miller factors to grant an exceptional 
downward departure from the standard sentencing range.137 In fact, 
“[t]he SRA does not require courts to be more lenient to juveniles or 
even encourage it.”138 The interplay of these various sentencing laws 
can, in certain circumstances, require the imposition of determinate term 
sentences of fifty years or longer.139 Such long mandatory determinate 
sentences or “life-equivalent” sentences, while not technically life 
without parole, carry with them similar constitutional deficiencies.140 
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.505. The defendant’s prior criminal record determines the 
offender score. Id. § 9.94A.525. As detailed below, special rules apply to sentencing for aggravated 
first degree murder. See id. § 10.95.030. 
134. Id. § 9.94A.589(b) (sentences for serious violent crimes must be served consecutively); id. 
§ 9.94A.533(e) (firearms enhancements must be served consecutively to sentence for underlying 
offense). 
135. Id. § 9.94A.535; cf. In re Mulholland, 161 Wash. 2d 322, 331, 166 P.3d 677, 682 (2007) 
(holding that trial courts with discretion to run sentences for multiple counts of first degree assault 
concurrently in exceptional circumstances). 
136. State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wash. 2d 834, 847, 940 P.2d 633, 639 (1997); see also State v. Scott, 
72 Wash. App. 207, 218–19, 866 P.2d 1258, 1264 (1993), aff’d sub nom. State v. Ritchie, 126 
Wash. 2d 388, 894 P.2d 1308 (1995) (“Scott asserts that his youth, 17 years old at the time of the 
crime, limited his ‘capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law,’ and thus, the exceptional sentence [above the standard range] was 
improper. This argument borders on the absurd.” (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.390(1)(e))). 
137. See, e.g., Ha’mim, 132 Wash. 2d at 847, 940 P.2d at 639 (age); State v. Freitag, 127 Wash. 
2d 141, 144, 896 P.2d 1254, 1256 (1995) (desire to improve self through community service); State 
v. Hodges, 70 Wash. App. 621, 624, 855 P.2d 291, 293 (1993) (selling drugs to put food on the 
table); State v. Sanchez, 69 Wash. App. 255, 260, 848 P.2d 208, 211 (1993) (limited education); 
State v. Allert, 58 Wash. App. 200, 205, 791 P.2d 932, 935 (1990), rev’d, 117 Wash. 2d 156, 815 
P.2d 752 (1991) (depression and alcoholism); State v. Estrella, 115 Wash. 2d 350, 359–60, 798 P.2d 
289, 293 (1990) (willingness to rehabilitate); State v. Pennington, 112 Wash. 2d 606, 611, 772 P.2d 
1009, 1012 (1989) (drug or alcohol problem); State v. Rogers, 112 Wash. 2d 180, 185, 770 P.2d 
180, 182 (1989) (emotional and psychological stress); State v. Pascal, 108 Wash. 2d 125, 137, 736 
P.2d 1065, 1072 (1987) (lack of danger to community and no criminal record).  
138. State v. Ramos, 174 Wash. App. 1042, No. 30279–2–III, at *13 (Apr. 16, 2013) 
(unpublished). 
139. See, e.g., State v. Solis-Diaz, 152 Wash. App. 1038, 2009 WL 3261249, at *3 (Oct. 13, 
2009) (unpublished) (sixteen-year-old defendant sentenced to 1111 months in prison following 
conviction on six counts of first degree assault with mandatory firearm enhancements). 
140. See Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding a 254-year sentence 
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These life-equivalent cases and the life-without-parole cases share 
defining characteristics. Each involves a crime committed by a child. 
Many of these children are undoubtedly impacted by the psychosocial, 
neurological, and environmental factors that led Kuntrell Jackson and 
Evan Miller to commit murder. Furthermore, each faces a long 
determinate sentence that the child will not outlive; functionally life 
without parole.141 The unpleasant realities of prison life reduce the life 
expectancies of many prisoners incarcerated as children.142 And so, even 
determinate term sentences of no more than a few decades may actually 
“indistinguishable” from life without parole); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121–22 (Iowa 
2013) (holding a mandatory minimum sixty-year term before parole eligibility is “functional 
equivalent of life without parole”); People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (finding a 
110-year mandatory minimum term violates Graham); In re Grisby, 121 Wash. 2d 419, 424, 853 
P.2d 901, 903 (1993) (finding that consecutive minimum sentences that require more than two 
hundred years before first parole eligibility result in “functional equivalent” of life without parole 
sentence). 
141. A number of courts have recognized that, at some point, long determinate sentences become 
life-without-parole sentences. Moore, 725 F.3d at 1191 (“Moore’s sentence of 254 years is 
materially indistinguishable from a life sentence without parole because Moore will not be eligible 
for parole within his lifetime.”); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121–22 (mandatory minimum sixty-year 
term is “functional equivalent of life without parole”); Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295; Grisby, 121 
Wash. 2d at 424, 853 P.2d at 903. However, efforts to determine the length of a “life” term 
prospectively have been criticized. See In re Diaz, 170 Wash. App. 1039, 2012 WL 5348865, at *7 
n.6 (Sept. 8, 2012) (unpublished); Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), 
review granted, 107 So. 3d 405 (Fla. 2012) (“At what number of years would the Eighth 
Amendment become implicated in the sentencing of a juvenile: twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, some 
lesser or greater number? Would gain time be taken into account? Could the number vary from 
offender to offender based on race, gender, socioeconomic class or other criteria? Does the number 
of crimes matter? There is language in the Graham majority opinion that suggests that no matter the 
number of offenses or victims or type of crime, a juvenile may not receive a sentence that will cause 
him to spend his entire life incarcerated without a chance for rehabilitation, in which case it would 
make no logical difference whether the sentence is ‘life’ or 107 years. Without any tools to work 
with, however, we can only apply Graham as it is written. If the Supreme Court has more in mind, it 
will have to say what that is.”). 
142. A person suffers a two-year decline in life expectancy for every year locked away in prison. 
Evelyn J. Patterson, The Dose–Response of Time Served in Prison on Mortality: New York State, 
1989–2003, 103 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 523, 526 (2013). The high levels of violence and 
communicable diseases, poor diets, and shoddy health care all contribute to a significant reduction 
in life expectancy behind bars. See United States v. Taveras, 436 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (finding “persistent problems in United States penitentiaries of prisoner rape, gang violence, 
the use of excessive force by officers, [and] contagious diseases” that lead to a lower life expectancy 
in prisons in the United States), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Pepin, 514 
F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008); JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, CONFRONTING 
CONFINEMENT 11 (2006). Entering prison at a young age is particularly dangerous. Youth 
incarcerated in adult prisons are five times more likely to be victims of sexual or physical assault 
than are adults. GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 142, at 11; Deborah LaBelle, Michigan Life 
Expectancy Data for Youth Serving Natural Life Sentences, http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/Michigan-Life-Expectancy-Data-Youth-Serving-Life.pdf (last visited Dec. 
12, 2013). 
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result in life in prison. Finally, even if a prisoner survives long enough to 
see release after a long determinate sentence, parole may be effectively 
meaningless because of the prisoner’s age and related disabilities and 
limitations. 
The Supreme Court in Graham viewed the concept of “life” as 
broader than simply biological survival. It implicitly endorsed the notion 
that release from prison should be available at a time at which a 
defendant might actually “live” outside the prison walls for some 
appreciable period.143 
Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance 
for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation 
with society, no hope. Maturity can lead to that considered 
reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and 
rehabilitation. A young person who knows that he or she has no 
chance to leave prison before life’s end has little incentive to 
become a responsible individual.144 
Parole eligibility must therefore begin early enough that the prisoner can 
expect to enjoy some significant quality of life upon release. Until very 
recently, children like Guadelupe Solis-Diaz faced decades long 
sentences, with no realistic opportunity for any future life outside prison 
walls, and without any court considering any of the mitigating factors 
identified in Miller. 
Sixteen-year-old Guadelupe Solis-Diaz fired seven shots at a group of 
people standing in front of a Centralia bar from a car driven by a twenty-
one-year-old accomplice on August 10, 2007.145 He missed everyone. 
Following his arrest, Solis-Diaz was charged with six counts of first-
degree assault, one count of drive-by shooting, and the unlawful 
possession of a firearm.146 The teenager rejected a prosecution plea offer 
of 180 months and proceeded to trial. Tried as an adult, he was 
convicted and sentenced to 1111 months—over ninety-two years—in 
143. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 (2010) (“The State does not execute the offender 
sentenced to life without parole, but the sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is 
irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.”).  
144. Id. at 79. 
145. In re Diaz, 170 Wash. App. 1039, 2012 WL 5348865, at *1 (Sept. 18, 2012) (unpublished). 
Solis-Diaz’s case also demonstrates how a defendant’s youth can cloud his judgment as discussed 
above. Solis-Diaz rejected a plea offer of 180 months imprisonment. Even though video evidence 
placed him with a gun in the car at the time of the shooting, eyewitnesses identified him as the 
shooter, and his alleged alibi witnesses were all easily discredited, he nonetheless rejected the plea 
offer and decided to proceed to trial. Id.; see also State v. Solis-Diaz, 152 Wash. App. 1038, 2009 
WL 3261249 (Oct. 13, 2009) (unpublished).  
146. In re Diaz, 170 Wash. App. 1039, at *1. 
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prison. His attorney called no witnesses on his behalf at his sentencing 
hearing.147 Solis-Diaz was condemned to die in prison for a crime which 
injured no one and without any court considering any mitigating factors. 
His case exemplifies the harsh and disproportionate consequences that 
can arise under a mandatory determinate sentencing scheme that does 
not allow for individualized sentencing or a realistic opportunity for 
parole. 
Other men and women housed in Washington’s prisons share similar 
fates. And while the particular circumstances that led these life-
equivalent inmates to prison have not received significant attention, 
certain facts are known. Data provided by Washington State’s 
Department of Corrections (DOC) indicates that as of November 2010 
there were more than 220 people serving sentences of longer than twenty 
years for crimes they committed as children. 148 More than twenty people 
are serving determinate terms of between forty and fifty years, and an 
additional twenty-three people are serving terms of more than fifty 
years.149 Forty percent of people serving more than twenty years are 
people of color.150 The DOC estimates that over fifteen percent of people 
serving more than twenty years are serving long determinate sentences 
for non-homicide related crimes committed as children.151 While they 
committed crimes in which no one died, they nonetheless received long, 
mandatory determinate sentences. Fortunately, courts, legislatures, and 
the public in general have begun to push back against the imposition of 
such severe criminal sentences. 
147. Id. Because of the nature of the charges against him and his age, Solis-Diaz was “auto-
declined” without a hearing from juvenile court into adult court. See WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(E)(I) (2012). Solis-Diaz’s attorney failed to call a single witness at his 
sentencing hearing or even argue that his age should be considered a mitigating factor in deciding 
the appropriate sentence within the 927 to 1111 month range. In re Diaz, 170 Wash. App. 1039, at 
*2. Upon collateral review, the Court of Appeals remanded Solis-Diaz’s case to the trial court for 
resentencing because of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage. Id. at *7. 
148. In October 2009 and again in November 2010, advocates with Columbia Legal Services 
(CLS) requested and received demographic data from DOC for all people incarcerated as children in 
Washington’s prisons as of those dates. The authors and others have reviewed that data which is on 
file with CLS. DOC JLWOP INFORMATION, supra note 88. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. The Washington State DOC recently released information about the people that it 
believes are eligible for resentencings or parole reviews under the Senate Bill. CLS independently 
reviewed extensive DOC records and has reached different conclusions regarding the precise 
numbers of inmates the Senate Bill affects. CLS is working with DOC to clarify the discrepancy and 
ensure that all eligible people receive resentencings or parole reviews. 
151. DOC JLWOP INFORMATION, supra note 88. 
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V. MILLER AND GRAHAM ILLUSTRATE A LARGER TREND 
AWAY FROM SENTENCING YOUTH TO THE MOST 
SEVERE CRIMINAL SENTENCES 
Science reaffirms the fundamental differences between youth and 
adults that the law and society have long recognized. Laws prohibit 
children under eighteen from engaging in a number of otherwise legal 
activities—from smoking and drinking to voting and serving on a jury. 
Private industry also regulates the behavior of young people. Because 
they tend to drive more recklessly and cause more accidents, most 
automobile rental companies refuse to rent to anyone under the age of 
twenty-one and require that anyone under the age of twenty-five pay an 
additional “risky driver surcharge.”152 These long-standing limitations 
on the conduct of children are justified—largely because of their 
diminished capacities, the likelihood that they will act in rash and 
socially irresponsible ways, and because of their susceptibility to harsh 
environmental influences.153 
Because of these inherent traits of childhood, such legally recognized 
limitations do not violate a child’s rights. “States validly may limit the 
freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of 
important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences.”154 
This “separate analysis of juvenile constitutional rights [is] justified by 
152. See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, AVIS, http://redirect.avis.com/corp_accounts/tandc.html 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2014); Age Restrictions and Surcharges, BUDGET, http://www.budget.com/ 
budgetWeb/html/en/common/agePopUp.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2014); Rent a Car Under 25, 
DOLLAR, http://www.dollar.com/car_rental_information/main/rent_a_car_under_25 (last visited Aug. 
22, 2014). 
153. By statute, people under the age of eighteen may not legally engage in any of the following 
activities: serve in the military without parental consent, 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2012); marry without 
parental permission, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.015(1) (2012); execute a will, id. § 26.28.015(2); 
vote, id. § 26.28.015(3); enter into legally binding contracts, id. § 26.28.015(4); consent to all forms 
of medical care without parental permission, id. § 26.28.015(5); serve on a jury, id. § 2.36.070 
(2012); consent to sexual activity, id. § 9A.44.093 (2012) (sexual misconduct with a minor in the 
first degree); purchase or view pornography, id. §§ 9.68.050–9.68.060 (2012); smoke, id. 
§ 70.155.080 (2012); gamble, id. § 67.70.120; drink alcohol, id. § 66.44.270 (2012); purchase 
tobacco, id. § 26.28.080; or pawn personal items, id. § 19.60.066 (2012). 
154. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979); cf. State v. Sieyes, 168 Wash. 2d 276, 304, 222 
P.3d 995, 1009 (2010) (“[T]he State may limit the constitutional rights of adolescents in 
circumstances different from those applied to adults in some contexts.”). For example, states may 
limit children’s First Amendment rights, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636–43 (1968), 
access to abortion services, Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) 
(holding that states may require parental consent for a minor to obtain an abortion), and procedural 
protections in criminal matters, Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) (holding that juvenile 
court need not provide same procedural protections as adult criminal court), without violating the 
Constitution. 
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(1) the particular vulnerability of children; (2) their inability to make 
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and (3) the importance of the 
parental role in child rearing.”155 Therefore, the legal landscape is 
“replete with laws and judicial recognition that children cannot be 
viewed simply as miniature adults.”156 
Society and the law treat youth differently than adults because youth 
and adults act differently. The Miller decision reaffirms this time-
honored principle.157 However, during the period when most of the men 
serving life without parole in Washington were sentenced, there was a 
movement away from this belief. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, criminal justice policy and practice was 
influenced by the notion that the country was facing an epidemic of 
“juvenile superpredators.” Princeton Professor John DiIulio, who coined 
the term, warned of a growing storm of “radically impulsive, brutally 
remorseless” teenagers who “murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal 
deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs, and create serious communal 
disorders.”158 Academics blamed this development on a culture of 
“moral poverty” in which youth were “surrounded by deviant delinquent 
and criminal adults in abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless and 
jobless settings.”159 These views were shared by many influential 
academics and policy makers.160 
This focus on “predatory teenagers” had a racist overtone. 
Throughout the 1990s, youth of color were “overrepresented as 
perpetrators and underrepresented as victims in media crime stories.”161 
155. Sieyes, 168 Wash. 2d at 305 n.11, 222 P.3d at 1009 n.11 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
156. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011) (quoting Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114–15 (1982)). 
157. See generally Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
158. John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Superpredators, WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, 
at 23 (“We’re talking about elementary school youngsters who pack guns instead of lunches. We’re 
talking about kids who have absolutely no respect for human life and no sense of the future.”). 
159. Knight-Ridder, Experts: Kids Not Mutating Rising Violence Rate Blamed on Firearms, 
SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, May 29, 1996, at 1. 
160. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 507 (1995) (predicting thousands 
more “young muggers, killers and thieves”); Peter Annin, ‘Superpredators’ Arrive: Should We 
Cage this New Breed of Vicious Kids, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57 (Cook County State 
Attorney Jack O’Malley stated, “It’s ‘Lord of the Flies’ on a massive scale . . . . Those states that 
fail to prepare for the superpredators will regret it.”); Violent Crimes Down For Fifth Straight Year, 
SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Jun. 4, 1997, available at http://www.spokesman.com/stories/ 
1997/jun/04/violent-crimes-down-for-fifth-straight-year (Spokane Police Chief Terry Mangan 
claimed that the five-year decrease in Washington’s juvenile crime rate would be “short-lived” and 
that “we shouldn’t rest on our laurels.”). 
161. Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. 
 
                                                     
 
12 - Straley_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  9:24 PM 
2014] MILLER’S PROMISE 991 
Academics played to the fear of children of color: 
Think how many black children grow up where parents neglect 
and abuse them, where other adults and teenagers harass and 
harm them, where drug dealers exploit them. Not surprisingly, in 
return for the favor, some of these children kill, rape, maim, and 
steal without remorse.162 
Though crime rates had remained steady since the 1970s and fell to 
historically low levels in the following years,163 this discourse infected 
the media’s coverage of youth and crime throughout the 1990s,164 and 
affected how children were tried and sentenced. Forty-nine states, 
including Washington State, passed laws to allow for easier or automatic 
transfer of juveniles to the adult criminal system between 1992 and 
1999.165 Supporters demanded that children convicted of serious crime 
face adult sentences.166 Juveniles transferred into the adult criminal court 
REV. 849, 852 (2010). 
162. John J. DiIulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY JOURNAL (1996), available at 
http://www.city-journal.org/html/6_2_my_black.html. 
163. In 1994, eighty-eight percent of Americans believed that crime was at an all-time high. In 
fact, violent crime rates had remained relatively steady since the early 1970s and property crime 
was significantly reduced from what it had been in earlier decades. Crime rates began dropping 
precipitously in the early 1990s and have remained historically low since that time. Lydia Salad, 
Most Americans Believe Crime in U.S. is Worsening, GALLUP WELLBEING (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/150464/americans-believe-crime-worsening.aspx. 
164. Between 1990 and 1995, the three major television networks increased the number of crime 
stories aired during their nightly newscasts from an average of fewer than 560 stories per year to 
over 2500; a 462 percent increase in just five years. See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s 
Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 397, 422–23 (2006). National magazines warned Americans about the supposed 
“superpredators.” See, e.g., Annin, supra note 160; Margaret Carlson, Children Without Souls, 
TIME, Dec. 2, 1996, at 70; Richard Lacayo, Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Time Bomb, TIME, 
Jan. 15, 1996, at 52 (“So long as we fool ourselves in thinking that we’re winning the war against 
crime, we may be blindsided by this bloodbath of teenage violence that is lurking in the future.”); 
Tom Morganthau, The Lull Before the Storm?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5, 1995, at 40; Kids Without a 
Conscience?, PEOPLE, Jun. 23, 1997, at cover. Local media added its voice. “More and more 
children in this state are killing and beating people. . . . Almost no community is immune.” Marsha 
King, Youth Crime Is Rising Fast, and Everyone Is a Victim, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993, at A1; 
Laura Myers, The Rise of ‘The Young and the Ruthless’: Juvenile-Crime Report Finds America’s 
Children More Violent, More Victimized, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at A5 (predicting an 
approaching tsunami of youth crime, because “[t]he children are poorer. There are more minorities. 
And they have more guns.”). 
165. See JESSICA SHORT ET AL., DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT IN THE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2005). In 1997, the Washington State Legislature passed House Bill 3900, 
which permitted the automatic transfer of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds into the adult criminal 
system for certain offenses. Engrossed 3d Substitute H.B. 3900, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997).  
166. See Norm Maleng, Editorial, A Stronger Response to Youth Violence, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 
7, 1994), available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19940107&slug= 
 
                                                     
 
12 - Straley_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  9:24 PM 
992 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:963 
were on the whole sentenced to longer terms than adults with similar 
convictions during the 1990s.167 Eighty percent of the men sentenced to 
juvenile life without parole in Washington were sentenced between 1987 
and 1999.168 While youth of color make up twenty-nine percent of the 
children in Washington, fifty percent of the men serving life without 
parole for crimes they committed as children are people of color.169 
The juvenile “superpredators” never arrived. After a brief, small 
increase in juvenile crime, violent crime rates among young people have 
plummeted since 1993 to all-time lows despite an increase in the overall 
juvenile population.170 These demographic realities have led even 
Professor DiIulio and other former proponents of this discredited theory 
to acknowledge they were wrong.171 
As the public concern died away, sentencing behaviors changed. No 
1888390; cf. Kery Murakami, Legislators, Locke Agree on Juvenile-Justice Bill, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Apr. 26, 1997, at C5. 
167. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 234–36 (Jeffrey 
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimmering eds., 2000). During most of the period between 1985 and 2001, 
youth convicted of murder in the United States were more likely to be sentenced to life without 
parole sentences than adult murder offenders. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, THE 
REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 
(2005); cf. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 53, 71 (Iowa 2013) (discussing superpredator theory and 
its impact on sentencing of youth, while holding that Miller requires individualized sentencing of 
youth sentenced to mandatory minimum 52.5 year term). 
168. See infra Appendix A. 
169. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 16 (“As with declination and other sentencing, the 
sentencing of youth to life in prison without the possibility of parole in Washington is racially 
disproportionate. Of the twenty-eight youth serving life in prison without the possibility of parole, 
fourteen are white, three are African American, four are Asian, three are Hispanic, three are Native 
American, and one is African American/Native American. Youth of color make up just over 29 
percent of Washington’s youth population, but 50 percent of youth sentenced to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.”). 
170. See CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & BENJAMIN ADAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 121052, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2009, at 8 
(Dec. 2011). Criminologists attribute this brief uptick in youthful violent crime in the early 1990s to 
the introduction of crack cocaine onto American streets, a corresponding surge in gang-related 
violence, and easy access to firearms. David M. Kennedy et al., Youth Violence in Boston: Gun 
Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 
152 (1996). 
171. See Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young “Superpredators,” Bush Aide Has Regrets, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19 (quoting DiIulio, “[i]f I knew then what I know now, I would 
have shouted for prevention of crimes”); James Alan Fox, A Too-Harsh Law on Juvenile Murder, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2007, at A11 (“[i]t’s time to rethink our rigid juvenile murder law”). Both 
Professors DiIulio and James Fox signed onto an amici brief in support of the petitioners in the 
Miller case. See Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller v. 
Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9647); cf. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 53 (discussing 
Professors DiIulio and Fox and the discredited superpredator theory). 
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Washington child has been sentenced to life without parole since 2004 
and only four received such sentences from 2000 to 2004.172 In recent 
surveys, members of the public have supported criminal justice policies 
that treat children as children, even those children who have committed 
terrible crimes.173 These changing societal notions and the Supreme 
Court decisions set the framework for the Washington State 
Legislature’s examination of extreme juvenile sentencing during the 
2014 legislative session. 
VI. WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE TO MILLER AND GRAHAM 
The 2014 legislative session saw a significant rewrite of the 
sentencing structure applied to children who commit serious crimes. 
Second Substitute Senate Bill 5064 (hereinafter “the Act” or “the Senate 
Bill”)174 that passed out of the legislature and which Governor Inslee 
signed on March 28, 2014, addresses two types of extreme sentences for 
172. See infra Appendix A. Children continue to commit terrible murders, but are not receiving 
life without parole sentences. See, e.g., Jonathan Martin, Youth Confesses to Role in Murder; 14-
Year Sentence Surprises Courtroom, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 29, 2005, at A1 (two boys who were 
twelve at time of crime sentenced to twenty-six years and fourteen years respectively for murder of 
thirteen-year-old playmate); Josh Farley, South Kitsap Teen Guilty of Murdering 87-Year-Old 
Neighbor, KITSAP SUN, Dec. 14, 2010, available at http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2010/dec/14/ 
mustard-found-guilty-in-murder-of-87-year-old/ (seventeen-year-old receives fifty-year sentence for 
robbing and killing eighty-seven-year-old victim); Josh Tucker Pleads Guilty in West Richland 
Murder Case, KNDO (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.kndu.com/global/story.asp?s=8019620; M.L. 
Lyke, Heather Opel, 14, Is Sentenced to 22 Years for Role in Murder, SEATTLE P-I (Aug. 16, 2002), 
http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Heather-Opel-14-is-sentenced-to-22-years-for-1093792.php 
(fourteen-year-old girl sentenced to twenty-two years for participation in pre-meditated murder of a 
sixty-four-year-old victim); Josh Peterson, Donald Schalchlin Sentenced to Nearly 11 Years in 
Prison, KAPP TV (July 22, 2009), http://www.kapptv.com/article/2009/jul/22/donald-schalchlin-
sentenced-to-nearly-11-years-in-/ (sixteen-year-old and fifteen-year-old adolescents sentenced to 
forty years and eleven years respectively for murder of thirteen-year-old girl and her mother); 
Tacoma Brothers Plead Guilty to Killing Fellow Teenager Last Year, Get Prison Terms, TACOMA 
NEWS TRIBUNE, May 20, 2013, available at http://blog.thenewstribune.com/crime/2013/05/20/ 
tacoma-brothers-plead-guilty-to-killing-fellow-teenager-last-year-get-prison-terms/ (sixteen- and 
fourteen-year-old brothers sentenced to twenty-six years and twenty-four years for murder of 
fifteen-year-old boy). 
173. COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 19; see also NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, 
POLLING ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF YOUNG OFFENDERS 1 (2010) 
(discussing a number of polls on the public’s feelings regarding juvenile justice issues). In a 2012 
poll, Washington residents indicated that eighty-two percent of respondents believed that all 
youthful murders should be eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years, while ninety-four 
percent believed parole eligibility is appropriate after serving thirty years. Jennifer L. Devenport, W. 
Wash. Univ., Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders: A Survey of Washington State Residents 
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Western Washington University Department of 
Psychology). 
174. 2d Substitute S.B. 5064, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014). 
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children: sentences for aggravated first degree murder and determinate 
sentences of more than twenty years. The Act grants individualized 
sentencing hearings in some cases and automatic parole eligibility in 
others. 
Life without the possibility of parole was the only available sentence 
for a child convicted of aggravated first degree murder before passage of 
the Senate Bill.175 Courts were barred from reducing a life without 
parole sentence due to any mitigating factor.176 The lack of sentencing 
discretion rendered Washington’s aggravated first degree murder statute 
unconstitutional as applied to children following Miller. The Senate Bill 
was the legislature’s effort to respond to the constitutional deficiencies 
of Washington’s aggravated murder statute. 
The Act provides for different aggravated murder sentences based 
upon the age of the child at the time of the crime.177 Children under the 
age of sixteen at the time of the murder must be sentenced to an 
indeterminate twenty-five-to-life term.178 Such children will become 
parole eligible after serving twenty-five years. However, release is not 
guaranteed.179 A court may not set a lower minimum term based upon 
individual characteristics of the child or other mitigating factors.180 
175. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2012). Former Revised Code of Washington (RCW) section 
10.95.030 (2012) provided for only two possible sentences following a conviction for aggravated 
first-degree murder: death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. See id. (“(1) Except as 
provided in subsection (2) of this section, any person convicted of the crime of aggravated first 
degree murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release or 
parole . . . (2) If, pursuant to a special sentencing proceeding held under RCW 10.95.050, the trier of 
fact finds that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the sentence shall 
be death.”). The Washington State Supreme Court prohibited the imposition of the death penalty 
against children in 1993. State v. Furman, 122 Wash. 2d 440, 458, 858 P.2d 1092, 1102–03 (1993) 
(Furman predated the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005), where the Court ruled unconstitutional the application of the death penalty to children of 
any age.). Therefore, prior to passage of the Senate Bill, life without parole was a mandatory 
sentence for any child convicted of aggravated first degree murder. 
176. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(1) & (2). 
177. Compare Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 130, sec. 9(3)(a)(i), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws 659, 
667 (codified at WASH REV. CODE § 10.95.030(3)(a)(i)) (requiring sentence of minimum twenty-
five year term and maximum of life for children fifteen and younger), with id. ch. 130, sec. 
9(3)(a)(ii), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 667–68 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii)) (allowing sentence of minimum of “no less than twenty-five years” and 
maximum term of life for any child who is sixteen or seventeen at time of crime and explicitly 
providing that “[a] minimum term of life may be imposed, in which case the person will be 
ineligible for parole or early release”). 
178. Id. sec. 9(3)(a)(i), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 667 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 10.95.030(3)(a)(i)). 
179. See id.; id. sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 10.95.030(3)(f)). 
180. Compare id. sec. 9(3)(a)(i), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 667 (codified at WASH. REV. 
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Sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds convicted of aggravated first degree 
murder will be sentenced differently. The Senate Bill requires an 
individualized sentencing hearing at which the court must consider the 
factors set out in Miller before sentencing an older child.181 Following 
such a hearing, the court must impose a maximum term of life, but has 
the discretion to set a minimum sentence of anywhere between twenty-
five years and life.182 Therefore, even after the recent statutory change, a 
court may sentence a sixteen or seventeen-year-old defendant to life 
without parole, but is no longer required to do so.183 
In addition to providing parole eligibility to some children convicted 
of aggravated first degree murder, the Act also guarantees parole review 
to another category of people: those serving long determinate sentences 
for crimes committed as children.184 Any person sentenced to a 
determinate sentence of more than twenty years as a child may seek 
parole after serving twenty years of “total confinement.”185 However, the 
Act does not allow a court to hold a Miller individualized hearing during 
this determinate sentencing.186 
CODE § 10.95.030(3)(a)(i)) (mandating indeterminate twenty-five to life term), with id. sec. 9(3)(b), 
§ 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(3)(b)) (requiring 
court to consider Miller factors when setting minimum term for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds).  
181. Id. sec. 9(3)(b), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 10.95.030(3)(b)). The Act explicitly requires courts to “take into account mitigating factors that 
account for the diminished culpability of youth as provided in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012), including, but not limited to, the age of the individual, the youth’s childhood and life 
experience, the degree of responsibility the youth was capable of exercising, and the youth’s 
chances of becoming rehabilitated.” Id. This is a slightly different formulation than the Court’s 
actual language in Miller, which requires at a minimum that a sentencing court examine the 
defendant’s “chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, 
and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” his “family and home environment,” “the 
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and 
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him,” and the prospects for rehabilitation 
while incarcerated. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012). 
182. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 130, sec. 9(3)(a)(ii), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 667–68. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at § 10, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.641). As 
discussed above, the Act grants younger children convicted of aggravated first degree murder 
automatic parole eligibility after serving twenty-five years. Sentencing courts will determine the 
parole eligibility dates for older children after individualized sentencing hearings. 
185. Id. at § 10(1), 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669. Youth convicted of aggravated first degree 
murder and any person convicted of a crime committed after his eighteenth birthday are not eligible 
for early release under this section. Id. § 10(1). 
186. Compare id. sec. 9(3)(b), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668 (providing for sentencing 
hearing at which Miller factors evaluated for sixteen- or seventeen-year-old convicted of aggravated 
murder), with id. § 10, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669 (granting parole eligibility to “any person 
convicted of one or more crimes committed prior to the person’s eighteenth birthday,” but not 
granting individualized sentencing). 
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The Act refers all parole decisions to Washington’s Indeterminate 
Sentencing Review Board (ISRB). The ISRB reviews all relevant 
information and holds a hearing. Only limited due process protections 
apply in ISRB hearings.187 The ISRB must order the person released 
unless it determines that it is likely that the person will commit a new 
crime after release.188 This standard for release is substantially similar to 
that included in RCW 9.95.420, which prescribes when the ISRB must 
order offenders convicted of certain sex offenses paroled from prison.189 
If the board denies release after the parole review, it must again consider 
the person for parole at least every five years thereafter.190 If the parole 
187. See, e.g., In re McCarthy, 161 Wash. 2d 234, 245, 164 P.3d 1283, 1288 (2007) (though due 
process does require “minimum procedural protections,” an inmate serving an indeterminate term 
for a sex offense has no right to counsel during ISRB hearing on petition for early release); WASH. 
ADMIN. CODE §§ 381-90-080 to 381-90-170 (2014) (ISRB procedures that govern parole hearings 
for people convicted of certain sex offenses). 
188. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 130, sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10(3), 
2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669 (the ISRB “shall order the person released . . . unless the board 
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . it is more likely than not that the person will 
commit new criminal law violations if released”). The Act obligates DOC to assess all people 
eligible for parole five years before the expiration of their minimum terms. As part of this 
assessment, DOC must identify appropriate programing and services to prepare the particular person 
for release. Id. sec. 9(3)(d), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10 (2), 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws 
at 669. Then, shortly before the expiration of the minimum term, DOC must again evaluate the 
person to gauge the likelihood the person will commit new crimes upon release. Id. sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 
2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10(3), 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669 (“No later than one 
hundred eighty days from receipt of the petition for early release, [DOC] shall conduct, and the 
offender shall participate in, an examination of the person, incorporating methodologies that are 
recognized by experts in the prediction of dangerousness, and including a prediction of the 
probability that the person will engage in future criminal behavior.”). DOC then passes this 
evaluation and other information on to the ISRB which conducts the parole eligibility review. Id. 
sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10(1), 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669. 
189. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.420(3)(a) (2012) (“The board shall order the offender released, 
under such affirmative and other conditions as the board determines appropriate, unless the board 
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that, despite such conditions, it is more likely than 
not that the offender will commit sex offenses if released.”). The ISRB utilizes a series of factors in 
making a determination whether a sex offender is likely to reoffend. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 381-
90-150. They include: (1) any refusal to participate in available programming designed to reduce 
risk of re-offense; (2) serious and repeated disciplinary infractions while in prison; (3) evidence of 
an inmate’s continuing intent or propensity to engage in sex offenses; (4) whether the inmate has 
expressed unwillingness to comply with any conditions of community custody; and (5) the 
assessment of the likelihood of future risk of re-offense. Id. Similar considerations will likely direct 
the ISRB’s decision making process when addressing people to whom the Act grants parole 
eligibility. According to ISRB data, over forty percent of ISRB hearings resulted in a finding that 
the offender should be released from prison in FY 2011. See WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CORR., 
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD AT A GLANCE (2011), available at 
http://www.doc.wa.gov/isrb/docs/at_a_glance.pdf. 
190. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 130, sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10(1), 
2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 669. 
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board orders the person released, the ISRB will also set the length of 
community supervision to which the individual will be subject once on 
the outside. 
The Act will have an immediate impact on the sentences of a number 
of people currently serving life without parole or long determinate 
sentences for crimes committed as children. The legislature explicitly 
applied the Act’s provisions retroactively to the men currently serving 
life without parole for murders committed as children and to anyone else 
currently serving determinate sentences of more than twenty years.191 
The twenty-nine men serving life without parole will all be resentenced 
in the near future. Those who were sixteen or seventeen at the time of 
their crimes will receive individualized sentencing hearings. The men 
who were younger will be sentenced to indeterminate twenty-five to life 
terms. Some of them will be immediately parole eligible, as will a 
number of people serving determinate sentences of more than twenty 
years.192 
VII. MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE 
The Senate Bill significantly alters the sentencing of children 
convicted of many serious crimes. While clear in certain respects, the 
new law leaves ample room for interpretation by courts in a number of 
areas. The nature of the individualized sentencing hearings required for 
older teenagers convicted of aggravated murder is one such area 
confronting Washington courts. The Senate Bill requires consideration 
of the Miller factors at sentencing, but does not provide other guidance 
to courts regarding these hearings.193 Courts should take direction from 
precedent governing death penalty sentencing in fashioning rules and 
procedures for these hearings. 
In addition, the Senate Bill does not go far enough to treat children as 
children during criminal sentencing. It allows courts to continue to 
sentence children to life without parole and it does not require 
individualized sentencing hearings in all cases in which such hearings 
are warranted. The science, societal shifts away from extreme sentences 
for children, and the spirit of recent Supreme Court opinions support 
both the complete elimination of life without parole sentences for 
children and the use of individualized sentencing hearings any time a 
191. Id. § 11, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 670. 
192. Id. sec. 9(3)(f), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668; id. § 10(3), 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 
669. 
193. Id. sec. 9(3)(b), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 668. 
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child faces many years in prison. 
A. Similar Procedures and Rules Should Apply to the Hearings 
Required by the Senate Bill Because the Miller Hearings Are 
Substantially Similar to the Penalty Phase Hearings in Capital 
Murder Trials 
The Senate Bill was the legislature’s response to the Supreme Court’s 
recent juvenile sentencing cases. Miller and Graham should therefore 
guide the new individualized sentencing hearings that the Senate Bill 
creates. 
The Court first in Graham and again in Miller recognized that a life 
without parole sentence for a child is tantamount to a sentence of 
death.194 In reaching this conclusion, the Court asserted that life without 
parole sentences “share some characteristics with death sentences that 
are shared by no other sentences.”195 They both “alter[] the offender’s 
life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”196 The severity of a life without 
parole sentence is particularly acute for a child because “he will 
inevitably serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison 
than an older offender. The penalty when imposed on a teenager, as 
compared with an older person, is therefore the same . . . in name 
only.”197 
Justice Kagan, writing for the Miller Court, reasoned that because life 
without parole sentences are “akin to the death penalty,” they demand “a 
distinctive set of legal rules,”198 including the need for “individualized 
sentencing.”199 Miller’s requirement of individual sentencing hearings 
explicitly rests upon the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence, 
which requires the same type of hearings before putting a defendant to 
death.200 That death penalty case law should therefore guide Washington 
194. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466–67 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 70 (2010). 
195. Graham, 560 U.S. at 70. 
196. Id. 
197. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 2467. 
200. Id. at 2467 (“Graham’s treatment of juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital 
punishment makes relevant here a second line of our precedents, demanding individualized 
sentencing when imposing the death penalty.” (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 89 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) and citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that the 
imposition of mandatory death penalty is unconstitutional because it fails to allow for consideration 
of character and record of individual defendant)). 
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courts when deciding what is required as part of the new Act’s 
individualized sentencings.201 
Courts must consider all relevant mitigating factors before sentencing 
a child to die in prison to ensure the sentence is reserved for only the 
most extreme circumstances. As Justice Kagan noted in Miller, the 
Court’s “[death penalty] decisions have elaborated on the requirement 
that capital defendants have an opportunity to advance, and the judge or 
jury a chance to assess, any mitigating factors, so that the death penalty 
is reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the most 
serious offenses.”202 Similarly, a court considering a life sentence for a 
child must “have the ability to consider the mitigating qualities of 
youth.”203 The breadth of the required inquiry is vast. 
A sentencer must be allowed to consider “any relevant circumstance 
that could cause it to decline to impose the [death] penalty” during the 
penalty phase of a capital murder trial.204 This mandate in death penalty 
cases requires extensive and exhaustive pre-hearing preparation and 
investigation. The Court has explicitly endorsed guidelines developed by 
the American Bar Association as indicative of what the constitution 
201. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. The body of case law regarding death penalty phase hearings is 
extensive. See, e.g., Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010) (holding that failure to develop and present 
evidence of abusive home environment and deficits in mental cognition and reasoning was 
constitutionally deficient representation); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (noting that 
even though defendant was “fatalistic and uncooperative” defense attorney must nonetheless 
conduct reasonable mitigation investigation); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (holding 
that defense attorney who had defendant evaluated by psychologist and gathered some documents 
nonetheless provided inadequate assistance of counsel because he failed to gather all relevant 
documents, seek additional expert testimony, or follow up on potentially mitigating evidence that 
review of available records uncovered); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395–96 (2000) (holding 
that defense attorney was constitutionally ineffective when he began penalty phase preparation 
week before trial, failed to gather relevant records, develop or introduce evidence that defendant 
was “borderline mentally retarded,” or other evidence that militated against imposition of death); cf. 
In re Yates, 177 Wash. 2d 1, 42, 296 P.3d 872, 892 (2013) (holding counsel’s failure to interview 
victims’ family members to determine whether any of them would testify that death penalty should 
not be imposed constituted ineffective assistance of counsel). 
202. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (citing Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 74–76 (1987); Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110–12 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597–609 (1978)). 
203. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
204. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987); see also id. (“[T]he State cannot channel the 
sentencer’s discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant information offered by the 
defendant.”); Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 144 (2010) (“First, the Constitution forbids imposition 
of the death penalty if the sentencing judge or jury is precluded from considering, as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense 
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Second, the sentencing judge or 
jury may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence.” 
(emphasis removed, internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
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requires as part of death penalty proceedings.205 Those guidelines require 
pre-hearing “efforts to discover all reasonable available mitigating 
evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be 
introduced by the prosecutor.”206 
An attorney representing an older child facing an aggravated murder 
charge must investigate, develop, and present a great deal of evidence 
regarding the child’s crime, family life, schooling, medical history and 
social networks to sentencing courts. Mitigation experts will be 
necessary to review this evidence, evaluate the defendant, and provide 
opinions on a variety of relevant issues. 
The financial resources required to carry out a constitutionally 
sufficient pre-sentence investigation and individualized sentencing 
hearing will be substantial.207 In Washington, at a minimum, a county 
must appoint two full-time, experienced death penalty attorneys, a 
mitigation specialist, and an investigator to any defendant facing the 
death penalty.208 Counties must also provide the defense with sufficient 
funds to retain relevant experts.209 Similar efforts will be required before 
a child facing a life without parole sentence can be sentenced.210 
205. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524–25 (2003); cf. In re Yates, 177 Wash. 2d at 41, 296 P.3d at 892 
(“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association [ (ABA) ] standards and the 
like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable.” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 688 (1984))). 
206. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (emphasis added) (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment 
and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C), 93 (1989)). 
207. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.030 (2012) (requiring all Washington counties and cities to 
adopt standards for delivery of public defense services, including standards on compensation of 
counsel, experts, investigators, and other administrative support for defense). 
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.010.030 requires that all Washington counties adopt standards for 
public defense that track the Washington State Bar Association’s (WSBA) Standards for Indigent 
Defense Services. The WSBA approved standards for indigent defense services on June 3, 2011. 
WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES (2011). WSBA Standard 
Fourteen delineates some of the resources that counties must make available to defendants in death 
penalty cases. Id. at 10. They include, “at a minimum, [two death penalty qualified] attorneys, a 
mitigation specialist and an investigator. Psychiatrists, psychologists and other experts and support 
personnel should be added as needed.” Id.; see also id. at 4 (WSBA Standard Four provides that 
“[r]easonable compensation for expert witnesses necessary to preparation and presentation of the 
defense case shall be provided.”); id. at 5 (WSBA Standard Six delineates that “[p]ublic defense 
attorneys shall use investigation services as appropriate. Public defender offices, assigned counsel, 
and private law firms holding public defense contracts should employ investigators with 
investigation training and experience.”); id. at 6 (WSBA Standard Seven provides that “[e]ach 
agency or attorney should have access to mental health professionals to perform mental health 
evaluations.”). 
209. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.010.030. 
210. The passage of time will significantly complicate the resentencings of some of the men 
currently serving juvenile life without parole. The Senate Bill applies retroactively to all of the 
thirty men currently serving life without parole for crimes committed as children. See Act of March 
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Counties must make those resources available because the legislature did 
not eliminate life without parole sentences for children. It should have. 
B. Life Without Parole Is an Unnecessary and Unjust Sentence When 
Imposed upon a Child 
The legislature did not go far enough during the 2014 session. It 
allowed Washington courts to impose life without parole sentences upon 
children in narrow circumstances. It should revisit this decision and 
completely ban them in every case. Life without parole sentences should 
never be imposed upon children. 
The United States is the only country in the world that sentences 
children to die in prison.211 In fact, the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child explicitly forbids sentencing anyone under the age of 
eighteen to life without parole.212 Because of the harsh consequences 
such sentences impose upon children and the availability of other more 
effective and just sentencing options, a growing number of states have 
entirely outlawed such sentences in all cases involving children.213 As 
31, 2014, ch. 130, § 11, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws 659, 670 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE. 
§ 10.95.0001). Nine of them were younger than sixteen years old at the times of their crimes. DOC 
JLWOP INFORMATION, supra note 88. These nine men therefore face mandatory, indeterminate 
twenty-five to life terms. Act of March 31, 2014, ch. 30, sec. 9(3)(a)(i), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws 
at 667. The other twenty men will be returned to the original sentencing court for full individualized 
resentencings. Id. sec. 9(3)(a)(ii), § 3, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws at 667–68. These resentencings 
present many significant obstacles because of the length of time that has elapsed since the original 
crimes. For example, John Lee Forrester was convicted in Spokane County of aggravated first 
degree murder as a seventeen-year-old in 1977. See DOC JLWOP INFORMATION, supra note 88. 
Constructing an accurate picture of Mr. Forrester’s childhood and life circumstances before coming 
to prison will be daunting. Potential witnesses have undoubtedly passed away, reliable records have 
disappeared, expert testimony regarding the person he used to be may be difficult to develop. The 
passage of time will require significant resources and truly able counsel in order to properly present 
mitigation evidence demanded by Miller. 
211. CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A 
GLOBAL CONTEXT 61 (2012) (“The United States remains the only country in the world to sentence 
a juvenile to life without parole in practice. Eight countries have been identified as having laws that 
could allow for a sentence of JLWOP; however there are no known cases of the sentence being 
imposed. Additionally, four countries have ambiguous language regarding JLWOP; however, since 
there are no known cases of juveniles being sentenced, it can be determined that the country does 
not practice the sentence. As such, there is only one country in the world with a child serving an 
LWOP sentence.” (citations omitted)). 
212. U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, Art. 37, G.A. Res 44/25, Annex, U.N. 
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, at 167 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2, 
1990. The United States and Somalia are the only two countries in the world that have not adopted 
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010). 
213. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401 (LexisNexis 2014) (notes reflect that the Supreme Court 
held “that the eighth amendment prohibits a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of 
parole for juvenile offenders” (citing Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)); D.C. 
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detailed above, recent local sentencing practices appear to reflect this 
international disfavor in sentencing children to life without parole.214 
While not categorically outlawing life without parole sentences for 
children, the Supreme Court in Miller expressed significant disfavor of 
such sentences.215 International norms, societal pressures, and 
developing jurisprudential principles all support eradicating life without 
parole sentences for children in all cases. 
Legitimate concerns for public safety do not require life without 
parole terms. The neurological and psychosocial development that all 
teenagers undergo means that no court can know with any certainty at 
the time of sentencing whether a particular defendant will become 
rehabilitated and redeemed over the course of many years behind bars. A 
long minimum-term sentence with parole eligibility allows for an 
extended period of incapacitation and potential rehabilitation, while also 
ensuring that no determination is irrevocable.216 The possibility of parole 
also encourages defendants to pursue available rehabilitative services 
and avoid destructive behaviors while incarcerated.217 Parole eligibility 
CODE § 22-2104 (LexisNexis 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-6618 (West 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.040 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
265, § 2 (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105.02 (West 2014) (providing that the 
maximum penalty for a person who committed a Class 1A felony under the age of eighteen is life 
imprisonment); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10 (West 2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (West 
2013–2014) (prohibiting the death penalty if the offense was committed when the perpetrator was 
under eighteen years old); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-
101 (West 2014); H.B. 4210, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014). 
214. See discussion supra notes 35–36. 
215. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (“[G]iven all we have said in 
Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity 
for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty 
will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty . . . of distinguishing at this 
early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, 
and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ Although we do not 
foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into 
account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” (internal citations omitted)). 
216. As the Court in Graham recognized, the possibility that a sentence may be commuted by the 
Governor at some future point does not provide a realistic opportunity for release. Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 301 (1983) 
(“Commutation . . . is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a 
sentence at any time for any reason without reference to any standards.”). Parole eligibility is the 
means to ensure that legitimate public safety concerns and the individual characteristics of the 
inmate are appropriately balanced and release granted when warranted. 
217. Graham, 560 U.S. at 73; see also Simon Fraser University, Prison Rehab Tied to Parole 
Decisions, SCIENCE DAILY (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/09/ 
120925143914.htm (stating that recent research indicates that parole board decisions impact 
whether and to what extent prisoners seek out opportunities for rehabilitation) (citing and quoting D. 
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allows a future parole board to evaluate the circumstances of each 
individual case in order to determine whether release is appropriate at 
that point. Life without parole does not present such an opportunity. 
Well-known racial disparities endemic to the criminal justice system 
in Washington also counsel against imposition of irrevocable life 
without parole terms. Children of color make up a disproportionate 
number of the juveniles caught up in Washington’s criminal justice 
system,218 and are also overrepresented among the people serving 
extreme sentences for crimes committed as children.219 Absent some 
realistic opportunity for parole and recognition at the sentencing stage of 
the role that race, poverty, and their attendant consequences played upon 
the actions of the child before the bench, those disparate impacts will be 
forever solidified among the people serving the longest sentences. 
Locking children of color behind bars for the rest of their lives with no 
possibility of release needlessly perpetuates a racially biased sentencing 
system. 
As many other nations, states and courts have recognized, life without 
parole sentences for children are unjust and unnecessary. While the 
Senate Bill makes important first steps in treating children as children, 
the Washington Legislature should go a step further and prohibit life 
without parole sentences for children in all cases. 
C. A Court Should Hold an Individualized Sentencing Hearing 
Anytime It Imposes an Exceptionally Long Sentence upon a Child 
The Washington legislature should also require a court to consider the 
individual characteristics of youth whenever it is deciding whether to 
sentence a child to many years behind bars. Absent a change to existing 
law, courts will continue to impose life with parole and “life equivalent” 
sentences without ever considering the individual circumstances of the 
children before them. Individualized sentencing should occur even in 
circumstances where parole is possible. 
Bernhardt et al., Rehabilitated or Not: An Informational Theory of Parole Decisions, 28 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 186 (2010)). 
218. See generally WASH. STATE TASK FORCE ON RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUST. SYS, JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY: A PRESENTATION TO THE WASHINGTON STATE 
SUPREME COURT 1 (Mar. 28, 2012) (finding that “youth of color continue to be disproportionately 
arrested, referred to juvenile court, prosecuted, detained and sentenced to secure confinement 
compared to their white peers” and that “[t]here is clear evidence of persistent over-representation 
of youth of color at every stage of the juvenile justice system”). 
219. See COALITION REPORT, supra note 89, at 16 (people of color make up fifty percent of men 
serving life without parole for crimes committed as children while only twenty-nine percent of 
Washington’s population are people of color). 
 
                                                     
12 - Straley_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  9:24 PM 
1004 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:963 
Even after the Act’s passage, in many cases, courts are required to 
sentence children to long mandatory sentences. By operation of 
Washington’s automatic decline statute, teenagers charged with a variety 
of different crimes are automatically transferred to the adult system for 
prosecution.220 Upon conviction in the adult system, sentencing 
enhancements, mandatory minimum terms, and mandatory consecutive 
sentencing laws mandate long determinate sentences without regard for 
the individual circumstances of the children before them. 
While the Act provides parole eligibility to some children, a 
mandatory two decades behind bars may in many cases be an unjust 
sentence once all relevant factors are appropriately considered and 
weighed. Furthermore, in no case is parole guaranteed. A child 
sentenced to life with the possibility of parole may nonetheless actually 
serve life in prison. In each instance, a court makes a determination at 
sentencing whether a life sentence is appropriate based upon the 
individual circumstances of the case and defendant before them. 
Washington courts have recognized that in some cases long prison 
sentences are constitutionally indistinct from life without parole 
sentences.221 In Matter of Grisby,222 the Washington State Supreme 
Court addressed the appeal of a defendant sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole for the murders of five people. The Grisby Court 
ruled that such a sentence “while obviously not identical, [is] 
substantially similar” to the only alternative sentence for which he was 
eligible: five consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole 
sentences, with initial parole eligibility only after serving two hundred 
years.223 Given that the defendant would never live to see parole, the 
Court ruled that the two sentences were identical for constitutional 
220. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) (2012) (sixteen- or seventeen-year-old defendants 
who are charged with variety of violent offenses must be tried in adult court). 
221. See State v. Rivers, 129 Wash. 2d 697, 714, 921 P.2d 495, 503 (1996) (“[D]istinction 
between life sentences with and without parole is not significant.”); In re Personal Restraint of 
Grisby, 121 Wash. 2d 419, 425–31, 853 P.2d 901, 903–08 (1993) (life with parole eligibility after 
hundreds of years substantially similar to life without parole); State v. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d 469, 
528–30, 627 P.2d 922, 952–53 (1981) (Dimmick, J., concurring in part) (because life with parole 
and life without parole are substantially similar sentences, a statute does not treat a defendant who 
pleads guilty and receives life with parole differently from a defendant who elects to go to trial and 
receives life without parole). But see State v. Thomas, 150 Wash. 2d 821, 848, 83 P.3d 970, 983–84 
(2004) (holding that “there is a significant difference between a life sentence with parole and a 
sentence of life without parole in the context of capital sentencing”). 
222. 121 Wash. 2d 419, 853 P.2d 901. 
223. Grisby, 121 Wash. 2d at 427, 853 P.2d at 905 (quoting Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d at 529–30, 
627 P.2d at 952–53). 
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harmless error analysis.224 
Similarly, in State v. Frampton,225 a majority of the Court agreed with 
Justice Dimmick’s concurrence that life without parole sentences and 
life with parole sentences may be constitutionally indistinguishable in 
certain circumstances.226 The discretionary nature of parole and the 
limited review available over parole decisions means that: 
a defendant who pleads guilty and receives a life sentence with a 
possibility of parole must expect he will serve a life sentence. 
He will, in fact, serve the identical sentence as a defendant 
who . . . was sentenced to life without possibility of parole; 
unless the State deigns to exercise its discretion and mollify his 
life sentence.227 
The Washington State Supreme Court recognized in this line of cases 
that the mere possibility of parole may not substantially alter the 
likelihood that an inmate will ever leave prison. The individual 
circumstances of each case will determine whether a particular 
defendant survives to see freedom. This is precisely the type of analysis 
the United States Supreme Court required a court to undertake when 
considering whether to sentence a child to life without parole. 
The principle that the criminal justice system must treat children as 
children extends beyond the life without parole sentencing context. In 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina,228 the Court, citing Roper and Graham, 
determined that different procedural rules apply when police interrogate 
children.229 Because “children cannot be viewed simply as miniature 
adults,” the constitution requires that they be treated differently than 
adult defendants facing police questioning.230 The Supreme Court in 
J.D.B. extended the rationale of Miller, Graham, and Roper and 
224. Grisby, 121 Wash. 2d at 424–25, 853 P.2d at 903. 
225. 95 Wash. 2d 469, 627 P.2d 922. 
226. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d at 529–30, 627 P.2d at 952–53 (Dimmick, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
227. Grisby, 121 Wash. 2d at 426–27, 853 P.2d at 905 (quoting Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d at 529–
30, 627 P.2d at 952–53). 
228. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011). 
229. Id. at 2403 (“Time and again, this Court has drawn these commonsense conclusions for 
itself. We have observed that children generally are less mature and responsible than adults, that 
they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could 
be detrimental to them, that they are more vulnerable or susceptible to outside pressures . . . than 
adults, and so on.” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 130 (2010) (internal quotations and other citations omitted)). 
230. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982)). 
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indicated that a child’s “chronological age and its hallmark features”231 
are relevant in many different phases of the criminal justice system. 
Consideration of the particular characteristics of youth at sentencing is 
one of the most important of these principles. 
Nonetheless, the Senate Bill provides sentencing courts with the 
discretion to make individualized sentencing decisions only when an 
older child is convicted of aggravated first degree murder, the most 
serious charge available under Washington’s criminal code. The 
legislature should promote good public policy and preempt legal 
challenges to the Act by amending it to require individualized sentencing 
in all cases where children face decades behind bars. 
CONCLUSION 
Science, legal principles, and societal norms all counsel against 
condemning children to die in prison. During the last session, the 
legislature took steps to mitigate the harsh, unnecessary consequences of 
long-term extreme sentences imposed upon children. However, it 
allowed courts to impose life without parole sentences under some 
circumstances and did not require individualized sentencing hearings in 
all cases where children face decades behind bars. The Washington State 
Legislature should reexamine its reforms in order to treat all children 
like children and provide all of them the real possibility of release. 
  
231. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012). 
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APPENDIX A 
Information Regarding People Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole in 
Washington 
 





Alexander Ryan Whatcom 16 2002 2004 
Anderson David King 17 1997 2000 
Backstrom Brandon Snohomish 17 1997 1999 
Baranyi Alex King 17 1997 1999 
Bassett Brian Grays Harbor 16 1995 1996 
Boot Kevin Spokane 17 1994 1996 
Bourgeois Jeremiah King 14 1992 1993 
Comeslast Kenneth Spokane 15 1995 1996 
Delbosque Cristian Mason 17 1993 1994 
Forrester John Lee Spokane 17 1976 1977 
Furman Michael Kitsap 17 1989 1990 
Gaitan Miguel Yakima 14 1993 1993 
Gilbert Jeremiah Klickitat 15 1992 1993 
Haag Timothy Cowlitz 17 1994 1995 
Harris Michael Pierce 15 1987 1988 
Hofstetter Ansel Pierce 16 1991 1992 
Lambert Donald Grant 14 1997 1997 
Lembcke William Stevens 16 2000 2001 
Leo Marvin Pierce 17 1998 2000 
Loukaitis Barry Grant 14 1996 1997 
Massey Barry Pierce 13 1987 1988 
McNeil Russell Yakima 17 1988 1989 
Munguia Jose Benton 15 1997 1998 
Ngoeung Nga Pierce 17 1994 1995 
Phet John Pierce 16 1998 2002 
Rice Herbert Yakima 17 1988 1990 
Skay Michael Snohomish 16 1995 1996 
Stevenson Sean Skamania 16 1987 1987 
Thang Vy Spokane 17 1997 2003 
Weaver Terence Whatcom 16 1996 1997 
 
 
